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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to compare levels of issue
conflict between political party followers in a current setting
with data on issue conflict compiled in a 1958 national survey.
The data presented by Herbert McCloskey, Paul J. Hoffman and
Rosemary O'Hara in their article, " Issue Conflict and Consensus
Among Party Leaders and Followers/* prompted their conclusion that
Democratic and Republican party identifiers differed only slightly
in their views on twenty-four national issues. It is suggested
that since the McCloskey-Hoffman-O'Hara survey in 1958, changes
may have occurred in the amount of issue divergence between groups
of rank and file Democrats and Republicans.
The following hypothesis is investigated: ”A re-examination
of levels of issue conflict between Democratic and Republican fol
lowers will reveal significantly higher levels of divergence than
were discovered in earlier research by McCloskey, Hoffman and
O'Hara.*’
A questionnaire including the twenty-four issues was admin
istered to 100 randomly selected voters in Harrisonburg, Virginia,
during spring, 1973. Results of the survey confirmed the hypothesis
and demonstrated markedly higher levels Qf issue conflict than had
been demonstrated in the 1958 study.
It is suggested that data from the Harrisonburg survey and
similar findings in other recent studies cast doubt on the theory
that the American electorate is characterized by a lack of conflict
over national issues. Further, it is suggested that the recent data
challenge the assumption that American political parties must blur
their differences and converge to centrist positions on policy
matters to attract maximum electoral support.

ISSUE CONFLICT AMONG PARTY FOLLOWERS i
A RE-EXAMINATION

CHAPTER I
ISSUES AND VOTING:

AN OVERVIEW

During the 1968 Presidential campaign, when Governor George C.
Wallace of Alabama ran as the nominee and leader of a newly formed
third party movement, the American electorate was treated to the
most widely voiced denunciation of the traditional two-party system
in twenty years.
Not since the Dixiecrat days of Henry Wallace's 1948 campaign
had the two major parties been so maligned for their alleged
"me-too ism/1
Gov. Wallace revived campaign history with his acidic description
of the Democrats and Republicans as "Tweedledee and Tweedledum," or
as the governor preferred to phrase it, "Tweedledumb and Tweedledumber."

He inspired the cheers and votes of millions of Americans

with his frequently aired charge that "hot a dime's worth of dif
ference" separated the two dominant parties.
Wallace's criticism drew support from unexpected quarters when
then-Sen. Eugene McCarthy also denounced the lack of clear policy
distinctions between the Democrats, who had spurned McCarthy's own
candidacy, and the Republicans.
The issue was not unique to the 1968 campaign.
Four years earlier, in his own Presidential bid, Republican

Senator Barry M. Goldwater of Arizona had appealed to support from
those voters who sought, in Goldwater*s words, "a choice not an echo,"
His point, of course, was that the 1964 election offered the elec
torate a rare opportunity to select from two men who differed
substantially on many major policy issues and reflected sharply
divergent political philosophies,

Goldwater told convention delegates

his opponents for the G.O,P, nominations, principally then-Gov,
Nelson Rockefeller of New York aid then-Gov. William Scranton of
Pennsylvania, represented only mild departures from the philosophy of
Lyndon Johnson at a time when the country needed a clear alternative.
The notion that Democrats and Republicans play an election
game of "me-toolsE/* did not originate with Wallace, McCarthy or Gold
water.

But their criticisms provide a timely perspective for a

discussion of issue conflict between the two parties.
The discussion which follows will review comments and arguments
by several researchers and analysts on the role of issues in American
voting behavior.

Particular emphasis will be focused upon issue

conflict between voters who identify with the Republican party and
those who consider themselves closer to the Democratic party.
A subsequent chapter will report results of a survey of issue
conflict conducted by the author in 1973.
Philip E. Converse, Warren E, Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk and
Arthur C. Wolfe, in an analysis of the 1968 election, noted:

In every United States election there are accusations from one
quarter or another that the two conventional parties provide no
more than " tweedledee" and "tweedledurf* candidates* However,
these accusations as aired in the public media rose to something
of a crescendo in 1968 • • • and even as measured a source as the
New York Times noted wryly that it would take no more than the
deletion of two or three codicils to leave the official 1968
campaign platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties as
utterly indistinguishable documents.^
Although McCarthy was dissuaded from a fourth-party candidacy
in 1968 and neither Wallace nor Goldwater came close to polling a
majority of the popular votes in their Presidential attempts, the
enthusiasm of their supporters was evidence of the dissatisfaction
many voters seemed to feel with the major parties.

The alternatives

typically offered by the parties in political campaigns are too
similar, some voters seemed to be saying.

It was a dissatisfaction

which transcended McCarthy*s liberalism, Goldwater's conservatism and
Wallace's populism.
Goldwater* s own race and, more recently the McGovern-Nixon
clash of 1972 are ample evidence that clear alternatives sometimes do
emerge from the parties' nominating processes.

But in the critics*

eyes, such ideological conflicts.are rare exceptions.
The observation that conflict is rare predates the 1960s.
As far back as the Victorian era, Britain*s Lord Bryce noted
in his comments on American politics that the two major U.S. parties
were "mirror images of each o t h e r O t h e r

analysts have concluded

that "in ideology and policy^positions the major American parties
are indistinguishable, and compared with other party systems they
show a monumental disinterest in matters of issue and ideology."
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Such comments defy quick, simple refutation.

Perhaps, however,

the voters* perceptions of the broad similarities in the two parties
can be explained through a brief review of the role of political par
ties in a political system.
Two general functions can be seen as party goals:

(1) to win

elections, and (2) to articulate ideological or policy positions.
Frank Sorauf, in

Political Parties in the American System, argued

that these two goals actually are incompatible, particularly in a
two-party political system.
For a party to achieve electoral success, said Sorauf, it must
mobilize the support of a large portion of the electorate and conse
quently must appeal to diverse groups of voters within the society.
Yet, to articulate a clear position on ideology or specific
issues is, inevitably, to alienate that portion of the electorate
which disagrees.

The contradiction seems inherent.

Electoral success

depends on mass appeal; ideological or policy stands imply limitations
of that appeal.
As Sorauf explained, n

. it is an inescapable fact that

within two- and three-party systems, political parties find it dificult to be both ideological parties and successful, electoral, brokerage parties •

• the necessity of winning elections stands as the

greatest barrier to ideology in the political party.***.
In the multi-party political systems of Western European states,
the conflict between issue articulation and voter appeal is of less
concern because election success is tied to proportionate voting.

Ideological faith to an issue-motivated constituency is thus less
troublesome*

But, as Sorauf suggested, the incompatibility of the

two party goals increases in party systems where fewer parties are
active*
For the fewer the competitors, the more inclusive the electoral
party must be* This then is the major dimension of the dilemma:
the fewer the competitive parties in the party system, the greater
will be the likelihood that any one party's success in performing
either of these two great party functions will be inversely
related to its success in the other*
But whereas in the multi-party system several minor parties
may join together in a coalition government, in the two-party system
the individual party itself must form the coalition*

The result in

American pluralist society is a two-party system in which both
parties seek to play a "brokerage?' or "umbrella?* role, drawing under
their broad banners a diversified coalition— a cross section— of the
electorate*

Because power is available only with 50-plus per cent

of the voters' support, each party seeks to spread its "umbrella"
widely enough to include all comers.
Apparently, the parties decide that, of the two goals defined by
Sorauf, electoral success is more crucial than issue articulation,
because without electoral success, the party ceases to have a platform
from which to articulate any policy positions at all.
To achieve electoral success in a two-party system, the appeal
of the parties inevitably must overlap, at least to the one voter who
will provide a margin of victory. And in a pluralist society where
class differences are not clearly perceived by most voters and

where few voters see themselves as ideologically-motivated, the
overlap of the parties* appeal may widen to the point that the
parties seek support from basically the same constituencies.
Socio-economic class identification does not clearly div
ide American voters into distinct groups.

Robert E. Lane and

David 0. Sears concluded in Public Opinion that many voters are
hesitant even to label themselves as members of any class.
"Even among adults •

• there is often a reluctance to

make class self-identifications.

As many as a third of a nation

wide sample were unable or unwilling to identify themselves as
members of any social class," Lane and Sears wrote. *
Neither are most American voters* political perceptions
triggered by ideological positions which they recognize.

When

Angus Campbell, Warren E. Miller, Philip E. Converse and Donald
E. Stokes compiled the data for their ground-breaking study of
The American Voter, which was based on studies of the 1952 and
1956 election campaigns, they discovered only 2.5 per cent of the
nationwide sample in 1956 that could be classified as ideologues,
and only another 9 per cent of the sample that fit the authors*
definition of "near ideologues."

These figures translated to

3.5 per cent and 15 per cent of all voters, the authors said.
They concluded that most voters were not motivated by ideological
considerations in their political perceptions.^
Neither does any one issue divide the American electorate
and thus make feasible diverging appeals by the two parties.

T~

spite of the heterogenous nature of the U.S. society, said Sorauf,
the parties are unable to identify "some axis, some line of separO

ation, on which to divide the American electorate.”
In the absence of a clear division by class, ideological or
issue grounds, the American parties apparently look in unison to the
center ground for support sufficient to provide electoral success.
It is not surprising that Richard M. Scammon and Ben J.
Wattenberg, in their 1970 study of The Real Maioritv. offered
identical advice to Democratic and Republican strategists: "Go to
the center."

The Republican strategy should be "a mirror image”

of the Democrats®, the authors suggested.

Neither party should

allow itself to be caught holding a minority position on a salient
issue, Scammon and Wattenberg urged.
to "play within the 35-yard lines.”

Party strategists were warned
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"It is the judgment of the authors that there are no two
strategies for victory--they are the same strategy with different
rhetoric.

This single strategy involves a drive toward the center

of the electorate,*' they wrote.
•Quite explicitly, then,” observed Washington Post columnist
David Broder, "Scammon and Wattenberg®s advice is that each party
should ape the other, so far as possible.”
Scammon and Wattenberg*s "pragmatic?* prescription is based on
the theory of necessary convergence--that the nature of the American
party system dictates a blurring of the differences between the
two parties, a muting of distinctions which usually leads to

near identical appeals by the two parties and to the very "me-tooisnf*
which Wallace, McCarthy and Goldwater decried*
Scammon and Wattenberg described the theory as follows:
• • • the drive toward the attitudinal center is crucial in
politics because it produces the maximum number of votes, and,
as is well known, the man with the most votes wins* * • • In a
most simplistic way for the moment: on a scale of 100, a
candidate taking a position of 25 on an attitudinal question
gives his opponent all the votes from 26 to 100* On the other
hand, a candidate taking a position of 49 or 50 or even 51
begins to cut into his opponent's vote*• • • This may sound
cynical; it is not* The jousting for the center in politics
is only a craven way of expressing a far nobler sentiment:
Politicians in a democratic form of government are in business
to represent the will of the majority of the people. • • • A
politician must either go where the ducks are or convince the
ducks he is where they want to be* 3ut the final choice is the
choice of the ducks, not of the politician*12
Broder put it more succinctly: "Party politics is almost by
definition accommodation politics*"
The effect of necessary convergence, Sorauf said, is that
American political parties become neutral brokers seeking votes*
In an electorate that divides in an almost infinite number of
issue permutations and entertains an equally large number of
potentially conflicting interests, the competitive party must
rely on non-ideological appeals— the attractive candidate, for
instance— or on pseudo-ideological symbols, platitudes, or truisms
to hold its disparate electorate together* The American parties
become great neuStral electoral brokers, whose art and skill is
the minimization of difference and division*• • • Their role in
a competitive two-party system demands an emphasis on consensus
and agreement, on the widely held political pieties rather than
the issues that divide men, * * * The capsule slogan and the
flashing smile capture far more political attention in the
electorate than the windy manifesto or the sober discussion
of political philosophy* ^

Herbert Agar addressed the same phenomenon in slightly less
cynical terms*

He noted that the process of coalition-building

forces political parties and systems to blend the specific concerns
of small

groups within the party into a total platform which

promises

something for everyone. It becomes necessary, said Agar,

to:
• * * water down the selfish demands of regions, races, classes,
business associations, into a national policy which will alien
ate no major group and which will contain at least a small
plum for everybody. This is the price of unity in a continent
wide federation*
The scenario which emerges from these authors' comments is of
political parties which mold a winning coalition from the clay of
docile voters*

As voters do not respond in mass to cues based on

appeals to class, ideology or issue, the argument goes, political
parties rely on broad platitudes and patriotic cues, and blur their
differences to avoid alienating any segment of the electorate more
than the opposition does*
The question that arises from this cynical view is: "Does a
common thread unite the members of an American political party and
distinguish them from members of the opposition party -- perhaps some
subtle and generally overlooked similarity among the party adherents
which ties them together?"
During the 1950s, when political scientists first began to pay
serious attention to empirical analyses of voters' opinions, several
researchers studies matters which impinge on this question*
In their study of The American Voter* Campbell and his colleagues

analyzed three motivations in the individual's voting decision:
issue orientation, candidate appeal and party identification*
Through their analysis of data from 1952 and 1956, the authors
concluded that, of the three motivating factors, party identifica
tion has the strongest impact on a voter's decision about how to
vote.

Candidate appeal was determined to be only a secondary

influence, while issue orientation had the slightest impact of the
three factors.
Issue position thus seemed an unlikely common thread among
party adherents.

A study published in 1960 seemed to provide even

further evidence that issues played a minor, if any role in attract
ing members to a political party in the United States.
In that study, which was published in the June 1960 edition of
the American Political Science Review* Herbert McCloskey, Paul J,
Hoffman and Rosemary O'Hara

presented their conclusions based on a

survey of "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and
Followers."

The paper's findings were drawn from a survey of dele

gates and alternates to the 1956 Democratic and Republican national
conventions and from a nationwide sample of voters*
The researchers examined levels of agreement and disagreement
among leaders and followers of each party to determine what
cohesiveness of issue orientation existed.

Their conclusions were

to have a significant impact on political scientists through the
1960s and into the 1970s.

McCloskey and his colleagues began with the assumption that such

cohesiveness among party followers— rank and file voters who identify
with a particular party— would be minimal.

In view of the discussion

above, their arguments sound familiar:
Since both parties want to attract support from the centrist
and moderate segments of the electorate, their views on basic
issues will, it is thought, tend to converge. Like giant
business enterprises competing for the same market, they will
be led to offer commodities that are in many respects identical
• • • It is one thing for a small party in a multi-party system
to preserve its ideological purity, quite another for a mass
party in a two-party system to do so. The one has little hope
of becoming a majority, and can most easily survive by remaining
identified with the narrow audience from which it draws its
chief supporters; the other can succeed only by accommodating
the conflicting claims of many diverse groups— only, in short, by
blunting ideological distinctions.17
Further, the authors wrote, political, cultural, historical
and sociological factors combine to limit the role of ideology and
issues in the American party system:
The development and enforcement of a sharply delineated ideology
is also hindered by the absence in either party of a firmly
established, authoritative, and continuing organizational center
empowered to decide those questions of doctrine and discipline.
Party affiliation is loosely defined, responsibility is weak or
non-existent, and organs for indoctrinating or communicating
with party members are at best rudimentary. Cultural and his
torical differences may also contribute to the weaker ideological
emphasis of American as opposed to European parties. Many of the
great historical cleavages that have divided European nations
for centuries . . . have never taken root in this country* • • »
In addition, never having known a titled nobility, we have
largely been freed from the conflicts found elsewhere between
the classes . . . Consider, too, the progress made in the
United Sates toward neutralizing forces which ordinarily lead
to sharp social and hence intellectual and political differ
entiation. The class and status structure of American society has
attained a rate of mobility equalling or exceeding that of any
other established society . . . Rural-urban differences continue
to exist, of course, but they too have been diminishing . . . In

short, a great many Americans have been subjected in their public
lives to identical stimuli— a condition unlikely to generate
strong, competing ideologies.10
Their research, the authors said, was intended to test the
accuracy of those observations.

The precise manner of their investigation

and a detailed discussion of findings is contained in Chapter II of
this paper.

For now, it is sufficient to summarize.

McCloskey and his co-workers concluded that the leadership
factions of the two parties "are distinct communities of co-believers
who diverge sharply on many important issues."

Rank and file party

members, however, were found to differ only negligibly on the same
issues that divided the leadership cadres.
The authors concluded that no support was demonstrated for the
hypothesis that party leaders ignore deep cleavages within the
electorate, and that parties converge to the center despite voters*
more disparate opinions.

In fact, said the researchers, "one might

indeed more accurately assert the contrary, to wit*

that the natural

cleavages between the leaders are largely ignored by voters."
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This conclusion was supported by Campbell ££ al. in their study
of The American Voter.

They noted that few in the survey sample

showed knowledge of issues and still fewer knew about the issues and
simultaneously perceived a difference in the ways the parties approached
the issues.

For many voters, the absence of perceived differences was

due to a simple lack of information, the authors said.
Party convergence on issue positions also plays a role in limiting
the voters* perceptions of party positions, however, they observed.

What underlies this failure to perceive party differences on
policies of concern to the individual? Its roots are to be
found in circumstances of the external world as well as in
limitations of the individual* Where distinctions between the
parties are academic, it would be surprising if only a few
people did succeed in discrimination, however intense popular
feelings on the issue might be* Nor can we always assume that
people failing to perceive differences are less well informed
than those who do, although this may be the general rule; they
may simply be more "up to date?* in their images of parties
whose policies are indeed converging.^®
Further support for the notion that issues play only a small
role in voters* partisan choices can be found in Gerald M. Pomper*s
Elections in America, Control and Influence in Democratic Politics.
Voters are not themselves ideological persons and therefore
fail to perceive even minor ideological differences between the Demo
cratic and Republican parties, Pomper said.

Neither does party

loyalty necessarily follow subconscious ideological lines— conserv
atives and liberals populate both of the major parties.
"Policy questions, then, are not central considerations for
many voters," according to Pomper.

"Policy considerations, therefore,

cannot be said generally to determine campaign outcomes. . . .

The

policy-oriented philosophical citizen does not appear often in
voting studies."^
It is interesting to note that although Pomper*s book was
published in 1970, his chief references for the discussion of issues
are The American Voter and "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party
Leaders and Followers," both of which were based on surveys conducted
no later than 1958.

This is evidence of the lasting impact of these

two seminal studies on political scientists over the last 15 years.

Both studies have been highly respected within the discipline and
have shaped the opinions of many instructors and students in
political science classes.

Relatively little work has been done

until recently either to challenge or support their findings.
Pomper agreed with Campbell jet al. that party identification
and candidate image play a stronger role in voting decisions than
does an individual's issue orientation.
Traditional partisanship and candidate personalities account for
much of the balloting. While many voters are concerned with
their particular interests, few are aware of or interested in
the entire range of policies or in general ideological
postures . . . Furthermore, voters are more conscious of past
than future policies. They make retrospective judgments on
the record of the incumbent farty, not prospective choices
between alternate programs.
With the role of issue orientation relegated to third place
in the heirarchy of motivating factors in voting, political
analysts of the late 1950s and the 1960s concentrated on the role of
party identification, or partisanship in voting.
William H. Flanigan, in Political Behavior in the American
Electorate, called partisanship "the most important single influence
on political opinions and voting behavior."

The concept may be

defined, he wrote, as: "the feeling of sympathy for, and loyalty to,
a political party which an individual acquires

(probably) during

childhood and which endures (usually) with increasing intensity
throughout his life . " ^
Early development of partisan loyalty was documented by David
Easton and Robert D. Hess in their paper, "The Child's Political

World," in 1962.

Most American children develop such loyalties

at about the second grade level, they asserted.
Most children do not become familiar with the term political
party until the fourth and fifth grade at the earliest.
But before this, as early as the. second grade, large numbers
are nevertheless able to assert a party identification . . .
Interviews . . . indicate that in the early grades— the point
at which party preference becomes well established— the
children may be adopting party identification in much the same
way that they appropriate the family's religious beliefs,
family name, neighborhood location or other basic charac
teristics of life. Nor do most children display partisan
feelings in a purely formal way. They seem to be aware of
the implications of party preferences as an expression of
explicit commitment to a point of view, however superficial
their understanding of this point of view may be • . •
but they did feel the pressure to adopt a partisan posture,
however apolitical its meaning was for t h e m . ^

Fred I. Greenstein, author of The American Party System and
The American People, stated that a voter's feeling of party loyalty
usually does not result from a conscious decision to support one
set of ideals as opposed to another.

Rather, Greenstein said,

partisanship comes about inadvertently as a result of social stimuli.
The development occurs before the child is capable of dealing with
abstract thoughts, according to Greenstein.
In the United States an individual's identification is usually
an evolutionary outcome of the largely inadvertent and unin
tended political learning that is absorbed from family, peer
group, neighborhood, schools, and mass media, remarkably early
in childhood. By the age of ten (fifth grade), more than
one-half of all American children consider themselves little
Republicans or Democrats, whereas at this age the capacities
for abstraction that are necessary for issue orientation are
largely undeveloped, and orientations toward candidates and
political leaders are immature in the sense that children tend
to be idealistically uncritical of those individuals in public
life of whom they are aware . . . For the young child, party
identification is so barren of supporting information that he

may be able to say, "I am a Republican" or "I am a Democrat^
without even knowing the party of the incumbent President.
Kenneth P. Langton elaborates on the procedure by which a child
learns "correct" political orientation:
Behavior which is rewarded is reinforced, that which is not is
dropped. Often incidental cues will lead to "correct*' imitative
behavior. A child seeking parental attention may hear his father
announcing proudly that he is a Republican, his father and
father's father were Republicans, and any honest and decent man
could not be anything but a Republican— an obvious cue. The
child responds by announcing that he is a Republican, and is
rewarded by receiving attention • • . However at this stage in
the socialization process, the child's imitation of parental
party preferences probably occurs without regard to the complexity
of values and beliefs that may be related to the parent's party
preference.
For those who adopt the view of American electoral choices as
the corporate decisions of an informed, philosophical and intelligent
citizenry, these findings may be unsettling.

If party identification

is the dominant motivating factor in an individual's voting decision,
and if such identification is the product not of thoughtful consider-,
ation but of puppet-like reaction of a child to stimuli which he
cannot even comprehend, purists* views of the democratic process are
put on shaky ground at best.
The disturbing implications of these findings are heightened by
further data and conclusions about the role of party identification.
The hope that party loyalties which develop initially among young
children are later redefined by more mature young adults, is apparently
illusory, according to researchers.
Greenstein noted that party identification which "might appear

to be one of the simpler and more fragile phenomena
be durable and most influential."

proves to
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Voting behavior studies indicate that a sizeable majority of
Americans not only form their party allegiances at an early, impres
sionable age, but also stick with that early identification through
out their political lives.
"It is apparent," Campbell and his colleagues said, *

that

identification with political parties, once established, is an
attachment which is not easily changed."

28

Pomper argued that the stability of party loyalty is overstated
in some reports, including The American Voter.

But he conceded that

most voters adopt the partisan identification of their parents, and
only about 20 per cent change during their lives.
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He also reaffirmed

the fidelity with which most children treat the party identification
they assumed so early.
Party identification is quite firm. It develops early in life,
before there is any detailed understanding of public issues and
governmental institutions. By the fourth grade, a majority of
schoolchildren identify with a political party. For the most
part, children assume and later retain the same party loyalty
as their fathers and mothers . . . Even among adults, nearly
80 per cent hold to the same faction as their parents. Once
established, this loyalty is highly resistant to change . . .
Even when an individual’s perception of an issue does not
coincide with his perception of his party’s position, partisanship
may not be threatened, according to Pomper.

White Southerners, for

example, may oppose integration, but nevertheless continue to
support the Democratic party, regardless oft the national party’s

general pro-integration image, he said.
Perhaps the most damaging blow to adherents of the purist
view of American democracy--those who hope to find intelligent, informed
citizens in the balloting booth— is the contention of many scholars
that a voter*s issue orientation is the product of, rather than the
impetus for, his party loyalty.
Reports of voting behavior studies of the last 15 years seem
unanimous in their conclusion that a voter*s party loyalty has the
capacity to shape his attitudes and his perceptions of right and
wrong on political issues.
As Campbell and his associates noted, "Once a person has
acquired some embryonic party attachment, it is easy for him to
discover that most events in the ambiguous world of politics redound
,.32
to the credit of his chosen party.'*

Or, as Pomper noted, "Loyalty to the Democrats or Republicans
will affect the perceptions and actions of the voter to a considerable
degree •

• Because of party loyalty, most voters do not wait for

a campaign to begin before deciding for whom to vote.**
observed that '* .

33

Flanigan

• partisan identification provides guidance for

the public on policy matters; that is, most Americans hold their
opinions by following what they perceive to be the view consistent
with their partisanship."

34

In the eyes of these scholars, then, party identification is
not a result of issue positions that the voter holds, but rather is

stimulus for the formation of issue positions that will allow him to
remain in conformity with his psychological commitment to the party#
Party loyalty is thus not merely an expression of voters* opinions,
but an agent of opinion-formation#
"In the competition of voices reaching the individual, the political
party is an opinion-forming agency of great i m p o r t a n c e c o n c l u d e d
Campbell and his colleagues#
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This opinion-formation role which in some other societies is
performed by class identification, falls by default to the political
parties in America due to the absence of salient class identity#
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The effect of partisanship, said Campbell et al., is "profound.'*
Apparently party has a profound influence across the full range
of political objects to which the individual voter responds# The
strength of relationship between party identification and the
dimensions of partisan attitude suggests that responses to each
element of national politics are deeply affected by the individual*s
enduring party attachments#
The individual’s party identification, therv stems from a set of
psychological and social cues he receives at an early age, and endures
through his life, molding his reactions to issues through further
psychological and social cues articulated in campaign rhetoric#

Ir.

a two-party system in which both parties converge at the center of
issue positions, it is doubtful that the voter will receive cues from
his party to alienate him from its ranks and send him to the opposing
faction#

Both parties will articulate a similar set of cues, so the

voter will note no conflict on which to base a decision for changing
parties#

"So long-as the party he supports continues to be identified
with those programs, leaders and groups to which he is attached,**
said Pomper, **he will retain his loyalty."
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With this understanding of the role of party identification in
mind, a contradiction seems to arise concerning the role of issues
in electoral decision-making and the theory of necessary convergence
of American political parties.

On the one hand, political analysts

say, parties are forced to converge on centrist positions and to blur
their differences to avoid alienating voters.

At the same time, they

stress that voters congregate in the center of the spectrum largely
because the parties* cues drive them there.

Can both be true?

The central question arising is, "Do centrist parties produce
a centrist electorate, or does the centrist electorate force parties
to assume centrist positions?**
With the background of scholarly argument in the preceding
discussion, it becomes possible to explore a few theoretical notions
of voting behavior and the American party system.
A first notion concerns the extent of centrism evidenced in the
behavior of the Democratic and Republican parties.

The adherent of

that purist notion that some voters are not mere puppets on a string
of sociological cues might argue that the parties do not, in fact,
converge to an exact sameness but rather reflect overlapping but
distinct coalitions.

The overlap may be extensive, but not total.

Sorauf argued that even parties seeking mass appeal in a two-party
system begin with a distinct nuclei.

Even the Large brokerage party, in seeking electoral aggregates
by minimizing differences, builds its coalitions around a nucleus
that distinguishes its electorate from that of its competitor.
The commitment of the major American parties to a constellation
of interests may, in fact, be stronger than we give it credit
for. Many of the voter loyalties within the American electorate
that appear to be traditional, old-line party loyalties, are in
reality loyalties to this silent, implicit ideology of interest.
The man who votes for the Republican party because his family
always has, or because his friends do, may be voting for a
distant, traditional, unspoken ideology or interest that has
been transmitted to him as he first learns about the political
world. Voting for the party of one's father may be, considering
the stability of social and economic status between generations,
ideological voting one generation removed.
Indeed Pomper*s example of white Southerners who remain faithful
to the Democratic party despite its general pro-integration image, may
upon closer scrutiny, actually be a dated example of ideological
voting one generation removed.

Declining Democratic support in the

South over the last two Presidential elections--first such votes since
the major civil rights legislation of the mid-1960s was enacted by a
Democratic Congress under a Democratic President--may be symptomatic
of Southerners* slow reaction to the party's shifting image.
Kevin Phillips argued in his work on The Emerging Republican
Ma.1 ority that white Southerners will make the switch and become part
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of the Republicans* own distinct nucleus for a winning coalition.
Others, too, concede that party images, and hence issue cues,
may differ more than Scaramon and Wattenberg would prefer.

Even

Campbell and colleagues admitted that whereas "articulation between
party program, party member opinion, and individual political decision
is weak indeed, .

* it may well be argued that we have imposed a

view of issues and policies that is unrealistically specific.

Significant

differences do exist in the public images of the parties*’* (italics

mine)^*
If this were true, voters would receive diverging cues on
issue positions, and voter surveys would detect alignments by party
allegiance and issue orientation dovetailing in at least some areas*
McCloskey and his colleagues, however, report little divergence between
groups of Republican and Democratic voters*

Yet Donald Stokes, in his

1966 paper on ’’Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency,**
found that differing perceptions of the issue positions of the two
parties* candidates did play a role in voters* decisions, although
the extent of that role is not clearly defined*
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So perhaps necessary convergence leaves room for some distinctive
appeals by the two parties*

And perhaps that divergence, however

slight, is perceived by the voters and plays at least a minor role in
the voters* partisan choice, either immediately or in retrospect*

The

concession may seem slight, but it invites further investigation*

If

party cues may include a subtle hint at divergence from strict centrist
positions, is it also possible that voters are capable of escaping the
ties of early childhood affiliations and of choosing a party on more
rational grounds?

Is partisan loyalty keyed to more than parental

guidance and platitudinous reinforcement?
For many voters, it seems possible that partisan affiliation
is more than an inheritance*

V.O. Key in his last work, The Responsible

Electorate* Rationality in Presidential Voting* 1936-1960* argued that

»»voters on the average base their vote decisions on the issue positions
of the candidates and on their expectations concerning how the candidates
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would perform as President*"

Key wrote the bool; m

some conclusions of Campbell and his associates*

an attempt to rebut

Khile Campbell e^ al»

had argued that voters responded to party cues and acted principally
in consequence with an enduring sense of party loyalty, Key responded
that most voters base their electoral decision on a responsible and
reasonable understanding of the candidates* positions and a desire to
further their own interests.
"The perverse and unorthodox argument of this little book,"
wrote Key shortly before his death, "is that voters are not fools."
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To prove his point, Key analyzed the electorate in three groupss
"standpatters’* (those who vote for candidates of the same party in
successive elections) ; "switchers?* (those who vote for candidates of
differing parties in successive elections); and "new voters" (those
who did not vote in the previous election).

For each group, Key

demonstrated what he considered a pattern of rational decision-making.
"In short, the data make it appear sensible to regard the voter
as a person who is concerned with what governments have done or not
done and what they propose to do rather than one guided, perhaps unaware,
by the imperatives of economic status or the tricks of Madison Avenue,"
he wrote.
First-time voters tend generally to align themselves with the
party which they perceive will best represent their own interests and
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general philosophy, said Key#

Their votes, he observed, are usually

consistent with their understanding of the parties* issue position
and their own leaning on the issues#
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"Switchers," he wrote, are not mindless wanderers between parties
whose positions they do not comprehend#
degree #

Instead, " to an astonishing

• voters in their movements to and fro across party lines

and from an inactive to an active voting status behaved as persons
who made choices congruent with their policy preferences#"
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The minority

party usually gains the support of voters who "are disappointed by,
who disapprove of, or who regard themselves as injured by, the actions
of the Administration,"
Key*s description
of the Campbell group's
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he said#
seems to have been tailored as a refutation
image of independent voters as uninformed,

disinterested and casual participants#
Some observers move bravely to the conclusion that the fate of the
Republic rests in the hands of an ignorant and uninformed sector
of the electorate highly susceptible to influence by factors
irrelevant to the solemn performance of its civic duties# That
conclusion is certainly not invariably, if ever, correct* * • •
Instead the switchers, who (in company with the "new" voters)
call the turn, are persons whose peculiarity is not lack of
interest but agreement on broad political issues with the standpatters
toward whom they shift. Democratic defectors diverge markedly
from Democratic standpatters; Republican renegades likewise
depart sharply from the policy views of Republican standpatters, • •
This should be regarded as at least a modicum of evidence for the
view that those who switch do so to support governmental policies
or outlooks with which they agree, not jjecause of subtle psycho
logical or sociological peculiarities#
Keyjestimated that between 12 and 20 per cent of the survivors
from a previous election switch their party allegiance in a succeeding

vote.

The very existence of a large body of switchers would seem to

cast a heavy doubt on the supposedly pervasive impact of early
childhood loyalties and enduring allegiances*
Even among the standpatters, who stick with a party from one
election to another, Key found a rational base for the decision not
to switch®

While enduring partisan loyalty may be cited as the

reason for this fidelity, Key viewed the loyalty as only a symp
tom of a basic agreement with the party*s orientation.

He did not

address the issue of opinion formation by the party, but implied
that voters may be more independent-minded than as portrayed in
The American Voter.
What of these voters who remain in the party ranks from
election to election? Are they obtuse diehards who swallow
their principles to stick by their party? . . . on issue
after issue those with views consistent with the outlook
of their party stood pat in their voting preferences.
Notably few Republican defections occurred among those who
subscribed to sound Republican doctrine. Democratic
deserters were uniformly fewest among those who concurred
with the pure and orthodox Democratic tenets of the time
. . . The facts seem to be that, on the average, the
standpatters do not have to behave as mugwumps to keep
their consciences clear; they are already where they ought
to be in light of their policy attitudes . . . Though
partisan groupings of voters are not models of ideo
logical purity, the standpatters of each party manifest
fairly high agreement with the party positions as
popularly perceived.
Key*s reference to **sound Republican doctrine,** **orthodox
Democratic tenets of the time?’ and "party positions as popularly
perceivecf* should not escape the reader's attention in light of
the preceding discussion on necessary convergence and the blurring
of party differences.

An expanded examination of that portion of Key*

comment must be postponed briefly, however.

It is the notion of

rationality among standpatters which is of interest at this point.
Taken together, Key's analyses of the three groups leave a
picture of voters whose decisions are triggered not by unseen
pre-adolescent psychological influences, but by an understanding
that one party's candidate offers greater compatibility of issue
orientation than does his opponent.
"From our analysis the voter emerges as a person who appraises
the actions of government, who has policy preferences, and who
relates his vote to those appraisals and preferences," Key con
cluded.^
Pomper also tied the voter's issue orientation to his concept
of his own self-interest.
"For a great many voters, policy does have some relation to
their party.preferences, although issues are not viewed philosoph
ically," Pomper s a i d . ^
Fred Greenstein noted that while partisan loyalties develop
initially among children at an early age, the child gradually learns
to differentiate between the parties in terms of what they
represent.

Only a few adults remain ignorant of these distinctions

in party stands, Greenstein wrote, while other voters relate the
distinctions to what is "best?* for their own group— peer, interest,
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region or whatever.*
These authors seem to agree that despite the lack of class

identity among voters, some basis for diverging issue orientation does
exist within the electorate.

The scholars seem reluctant to pinpoint

the basis for such divergence, but seem willing to acknowledge its
presence and its impact on partisan choice.
Even KcCloskey, Hoffman and O'Hara, who demonstrated the lack ol
substantial issue conflict among party followers, conceded that they
were prepared to find "contrary influences" that would counteract
the voters* convergence.
"We believed that the homogenizing tendencies referred to are
strongly offset by contrary influences, and that voters are preponderantly led to support the party whose opinions they share."
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Unfor

tunately, the authors neglected to define those "contrary influences."
Additional evidence of the potential for rational decision-making
by voters can be found in the voluminous data of The American Voter.
Data from both the 1952 and 1956 elections demonstrate that those who
claim to be strong Democrats hold the most pro-Democratic views and
that strong Republicans hold the most pro-Republican attitudes
toward the parties* candidates.
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It is interesting to note also Pomper*s observation that party
identification among veteran voters must remain consistent with policy
preferences and that newer voters, whose allegiance to party is not
so solidly established, tend to follow personal opinion on the issues
as much as social or party cues.
Group pressures, traditions and propaganda do not explain elections.
They are usually reinforced by opinion on issues. When party

identification or group membership is not consistent with policy
preferences or other short-term forces, a significant proportion
will desert their "natural" party. New voters, who are less com
mitted, will follow thg^r opinions as much as their sociological
or partisan instincts.
Whatever rationality is found in most voters is rarely based
on the individual's philosophical understanding of the issue's
ramifications and on a deliberate decision to support one side after
a debate on merits of the issue, the authors seem to agree.

Rather,

the voters perceive some cue, perhaps indirect, in a party's or candi
date's appeal which triggers a feeling of sympathy.

Likely, the cue

will relate to some group interest with which the voter is familiar,
although perhaps not fully knowledgeable.

In other words, Pomper

and Key do not attempt to argue that American voters are ideologues
or philosophers, but simply, as Key put it, that they "are not
fools."
The caution they raise is that a scarcity of the true philo
sophical citizen may lead some to conclude that all voters are putty
to be manipulated by pervasive social and political forces.

The

impact of such factors as psychological and sociological cues decreases,
one might argue, when the parties effectively perform the second of the
two party goals previously discussed--articulation of issue positions.
When alternatives are presented, the voters will respond.

In the

absence of such distinctions, the voter is forced to choose between
party labels and between candidate appeals.
Sorauf, among others, argued that the Democratic and Republican

parties, while not ignoring issues, sent out only subtle cues to the
electorate through the 1960s*
The American parties spell out policy stands tentatively and vaguely*
They do not have a flair for enunciating principles, nor do they
speak in one clear ideological voice* They do, as their critics
charge, bow before all the limits the political system sets to
their statement of programs and ideologies* But of the charge of
disregarding interest and policy issues altogether they are not
guilty*57
This subtlety of approach, combined with the voters* hesitance
to make distinctions between the parties except in the presence of cues
initiated by the party, may combine to cause the very centrism which
,in turn encourages the parties to mimimize their differences*

The

phenomenon may, in fact, be a circular and self-sustaining one*
Flanigan, too, noted the subtlety with which parties signal
their members on issue positions*

Frequently, the leadership of the

two parties are in agreement on an issue, he observed*

At other

times, the leadership factions of each party may be split among themselves, resulting in no clear cue gaining expression*
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Also, Campbell and his associates stated that even if the voter
is conscious of an issue and concerned about it, it will have no effect
on his partisan decision or ballot unless he perceives some distinction
in two parties* positions*
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As David W. Abbott and Edward T* Rogowsky argue in their paper,
"The Linkage Processs An Essay on Parties and

Opiaion,"x

At certain junctures there are virtually no
policy stances of the candidates of the two
issues* This condition is not very serious
consensus* However, when public opinion is

differences in the
parties on important
in a period of general
deeply divided and when

both parties have chosen candidates who take almost identical
positions on a nationally divisive issue, then the members of the
dissenting minority are denied an opportunity to represent their
opinions by voting* The virtually identical Viet Nam positions
of the Republican and Democratic party nominees in 1968 is a case
in point*
The crucial distinction which emerges from these arguments i^
between periods in which the party system puts out only very subtle
issue cues and periods in which true issue divergence develops and
voters become aware of a comprehensible split between leadership
factions of the two parties*
The importance of this distinction— the acknowledgement that
political context is also a variable that must be weighed in any analysis
of voting behavior— will now be the focus of this discussion*
Walter DeVries and V* Lance Tarrance in The Ticket Splitter note
that the political context of the 1960s was different from that of the
1950s*

The decade of Kennedy, Johnson, Vietnam and race riots was

"politically turbulent" and produced significant change in America's
political situation, they said*
Some observers have seen these changes in the 1960s as a major
realignment of the two political parties* Others have thought
they detected the emergence of new coalitions of voters or the
building of new majorities. In fact, some analysts believe that
we are experiencing the disintegration of the two-party system
as we have known it, arguing that if this trend continues, the
Republican and Democratic parties may be completely removed as
the major variables in most elections* A few analysts now
believe that rather than party, the issues, the candidates'
views, and the use of media both by the candidates and by the
voters are now the most important factors in a voter's decision*
Whatever the explanation, we do know that something happened
to American voters during the politically turbulent years from
1960 to 1970* Those years produced a whole set of political
paradoxes which have yet to be explained*5 *

Perhaps the most significant observation V.Q. Key made in The
Responsible Electorate was that:
To be sure, many individual voters act in odd ways indeed; yet,
in the large, the electorate behaves about as rationally and respon
sibly as we should expect, given the clarity of the alternatives
presented to it and the character of the information available to
it. (italics mine)02
Much of the body of knowledge of American voting behavior has
stemmed from surveys conducted during the 1950s.

The American Voter

and "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers"
have had a significant impact on later works in the field.
Perhaps a reassessment of the findings of those studies is in
order to determine whether they remain valid descriptions of the
electorate after fifteen or twenty years.

It certainly is possible

that the "clarity of alternative^’ presented to voters during the
1950s was greater or lesser than in more recent years®
Many of the precepts of the argument for necessary convergence
grew specifically out of the work of Campbell and McCloskey and their
colleagues.

Perhaps a re-examination of those research projects in

particular is due.
Do voters in the 1970s remain clustered in the center of the
spectrum?

Does no significant divergence exist among party followers?

Or is it possible that voters in the 1970s have responded to a greater
clarity of alternatives by moving apart, attracted by divergent issue
appeals from the parties?
Pomper published an article in 1972 which reviewed the role of

issues in Presidential balloting from 1956 to 1968.

It is a valuable

contribution to the study of voting behavior.
Using data from the Survey Research Center at the University of
Michigan, Pomper examined quadrennial election studies for the period
under investigation, analyzing voter responses to six specific policy
questions.

The items examined were:

aid to education, medical care,

job guarantee, fair employment, school integration and foreign aid.
According to Pomper, while partisan identifiers differed somewhat
in their approaches to these issues in the 1956 and 1960 samples, a
far more significant distinction emerged in the 1964 sample.

Perceptions

of the linkage between party and policy showed a similar pattern
through the four measurements, he said.
From this data, Pomper drew three broad implications.

First, i

should be recognized that the election of 1964 was a critical one,
'*initiating a new political era in the United States, rather than the
abberant event it appeared at the time . . _**

Characteristic of such

critical elections, said Pomper, is **increased voter consciousness
of policy questions, and the later electoral persistence of group
divisions based on the policy questions raised in the critical election.M (italics mine)
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In 1964 and again in 1968, voters aligned their partisan loyalties
in much closer harmony with their policy preferences than they had in
either 1956 or 1960, he discovered.
Second, Pomper indicated that these findings point to the possible

development of a ’’responsible two-party systeirf* in the United States.
A committee of the American Political Science Association studied the
two-party system in 1950 and recommended several changes to bring about
such a responsible system.
’’Responsible two-party systeirf' means a system in which the parties
are characterized by distinctively perceived policy positions, and in
which parties are relatively cohesive, Pomper said.

While he believed

this was an unrealistic goal in the 1950s, he predicted it may be more
obtainable in the 1970s.

Twenty years ago, he wrote, ” 0n most issues

the voters did not relate their policy preferences to their partisan
affiliations nor did they see a difference between the parties, nor
did. they agree on the relative positions of the parties.”
Pomper saw changes in the voters during the latest election he
analyzed, however.
Parties can now meaningfully stand as ” groups of like-minded men”
offering particular stances toward public issues. Their victories
can now reasonably be interpreted as related to the mass choice
of one set of issue positions over another. To this extent, the
conditions for a responsible party system have been fulfilled.
In light of Pomper*s optimism, it is worthwhile to review briefly
the prerequisites to a responsible party system stipulated by the APSA
committee in its 1950 report.
”An effective party system,” the report said, "requires first,
that the parties are able to bring forth programs to which they conmit
themselves, and, second, that the parties possess sufficient internal
cohesion to carry out these programs.”
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In a 1970 review of the committee’s report and progress in
the intervening two decades, Evron M. Kirkpatrick, longtime executive
secretary of the association and a member of the original study com
mittee, delivered a critical evaluation of the 1950 report’s lack of
"analysis, justification or clarification” and ” its popular missionary
tone.”
Kirkpatrick’s criticism took three parts.

First, he said,

political parties do not appear competent to formulate policy to solve
the nation’s complex problems.

Second, even if they could develop the

policies, it is unlikely, due to the lack of ideological cleavage in the
American political system, that parties would present clear alternatives
to the voters.

Finally, even if such alternatives were presented to

the electorate, the voters do not possess a sufficient level of issue
information to be able to choose intelligently from among them.

He

cited voting studies (of the 1950s) to show that voters base their
partisan choice on nonrational factors.
"The cumulative impact of voting studies on the committee model
of responsible party doctrine,” said Kirkpatrick, "is quite simply
devastating •"
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Pomper countered Kirkpatrick’s traditionalist arguments with
references to more recent voting studies, showing new patterns of voting
behavior which, he said, more adequately support the supposition that,
given the proper impetus, a "responsible?* party system could work.
Pomper cautioned, however, that before this goal can be achieved,

the parties must become more cohesive than they were in 1968.
Pomper*s final point was a particularly significant one in light
jf the notion previously expressed that voting behavior studies
conducted during the 1950s have had a pervasive impact on political
science and perhaps are in need of re-examination to determine if a
measurement fifteen or twenty years later will produce the same results.
The study of voting behavior has suffered, Pomper argued, from an
over-generalization on the basis of cross-sectional research, such as
The American Voter and the article by McCloskey €5t al.
Voter, he said:

Of The Ameri can

"We have assumed that this superb analysis of the 1950s

is a study of the electorate of all time."68
It is crucial to study not only the behavior of voters, but also
the political and social context in which that behavior occurs, he said.
Various environmental stimuli must be considered, and their effects
weighed.
It is significant to note that two of the

authors of The American

Voter. Philip E. Converse and Warren E. Miller, joined with two other
researchers in the fall of 1969 to make a similar plea.

In their report

on a study of the 1968 election, the authors said:
. . . some past findings have been to our mind "overinterpreted"
as implying that issues are poorly linked to voting preferences
because of innate and hence incorrigible cognitive deficiencies
suffered by the mass electorate in the United States. Merely the
Wallace data [[showing that Wallace voters in 1968 were motivated
by a feeling of compatibility with the candidate on issue positions}
taken alone would suffice to show, exactly as Key argued, that
the public can relate policy controversies to its own estimates
of the world and vote accordingly.

It is in light of this background of alleged "overinterpretation"
that Pomper urged a "reinterpretation" of voting behavior studies of
the 1950s by comparing the cross-sectional data of that decade to new
measurements reflecting more current political climates.

Changing

political winds alter the voter, he argued.
If the voter is viewed as a microcosmic version of David Easton's
political system analysis, he is understood to receive inputs from
the environment around him and to produce outputs (decisions) from
the raw material of those inputs.

But with each new output, the environment

is altered, and thus the inputs are varied.

The system (or the voter)

therefore operates in a constantly changing political environment.
It is shortsighted at best to expect the voter's outputs to
remain constant during twenty years* change in the political context.
Pomper concluded:
Most critically, we must emphasize in this context the effect
upon voters of the stimuli they receive from the parties and
other electoral actors. If^ these stimuli are issueless and
static, as they largely were in the 1950s, the citizenry is
likely to respond in the manner described in The American Voter.
If these stimuli are more ideological and dynamic, we are
likely to see different perceptions and behavior, such asn that
evidenced in the 1964 and 1968 elections, (italics mine)
In light of the information and arguments presented, it appears
that a re-examination of the research reported by Herbert KcCloskey,
Paul J. Hoffman and Rosemary O'Hara in their "Issue Conflict and
Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," is warranted.

As the

preceding discussion demonstrates, their study has played a significant
role in the development of a body of knowledge pertaining to American

voting behavior.

It has now been fifteen years since they presented

their findings and in that time the conclusions they propounded have
been widely accepted and respected within the discipline.

But their

study was a single cross-sectional measurement.
On that basis alone, a re-examination appears justified.

But as

the following chapter will indicate, additional questions about the
methodology and procedure-of McCloskey, Hoffman and 0 ,Hara*s research
make a reappraisal of their conclusions even more necessary.
In view of the arguments presented above, and particularly the
compelling argument by Pomper of the need for a re-examination of
cross-sectional research, an hypothesis for the research presented
herein was formulated.

In the following pages, data will be presented

to support and to confirm the hypothesis that:

A re-examination of

levels of issue conflict between Democratic and Republican voters
will reveal significantly higher levels of divergence than were
discovered in similar research in 1957-58 by Herbert McCloskey, Paul
J. Hoffman and Rosemary 0*Hara.

CHAPTER II
THE McCLOSKEY-HOFFMAN-O'HARA STUDY

In June, I960, the American Political Science Review
published an article on voting behavior by Herbert McCloskey, Paul
J* Hoffman and Rosemary O'Hara*

The article was to have a profound

impact on subsequent work in the field of voting behavior*
"Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers?*
examined levels of issue conflict on major national issues between
leaders of the Democratic and Republican parties and between groups
of voters who identified with the Democrats and those who identified
with the Republicans*

The paper was one of several reports stem

ming from research by the authors during 1957-58*
The authors hoped to determine whether leadership factions
of the two parties differ significantly in their approaches to
issues and whether the level of issue conflict among leadership
factions is reflected among party "followers•**
They took note of the phenomenon of party convergence and
its alleged necessity within the American party system and identified
factors which contribute to this convergence*

McCloskey and his

colleagues believed that "contrary influences?* would lead to issue
conflict between identifiers of the two parties*

As previously noted

here, the authors did not define such "contrary influences*"

The "Tweedledee-Tweed lediurf* view of the American party system
is widely held among observers of U.S. politics, they noted.

It is

a view, however, which had never been investigated empirically, the
authors contended.
"Although these •conclusions* are mainly derived from a priori
analysis or from casual observations of *anecdotal* data (little
systematic effort having been made so far to verify or refute them),
they are often taken as confirmed— largely, one imagines, because
they are compatible with certain conspicuous features of American
politics."^
It was time, the authors had decided, for a careful examination
of the "Tweed1edee-Tweedleduirf' assumption.

Despite those "conspicuous

features?' which seemed to evidence a party system in which differences
were diminished, McCloskey and his associates believed that issue
distinctions existed between Democratic and Republican voters.
To investigate this notion, the authors conducted a national
survey of voters.

In January, 1958, questionnaires were distributed

to a randomly selected sample of voters.

An identical questionnaire

was distributed to delegates and alternate delegates to the Republican
and Democratic national conventions of 1956.
The questionnaire included questions on party identification.
Each person interviewed was asked to declare which of the parties
he felt closer to.

Also included was a list of twenty-four issues

which the authors had determined were salient for that time.

In

selecting the issues, the researchers sought to include those matters
of public policy which appeared to be "most significant and enduring."
For each of the twenty-four issues, each respondent was asked
to indicate whether he favored an "increase," "decrease?* or "no change
The issues were grouped in five categories: Public Ownership
of Resources; Government Regulation of the Economy; Equalitarianism
and Human Welfare; Tax Policy, and Foreign Policy.
The issues, by category, were:
I. Public Ownership of Resources
A« Public Ownership of Natural Resources
B. Public Control of Atomic Energy
II. Government Regulation of the Economy
A. Level of Farm Price Supports
B. Government Regulation of Business
C. Enforcement of Anti-Monopoly Laws
D. Regulation of Trade Unions
E. Level of Tariffs
F. Restrictions on Credit
G. Regulation of Public Utilities
III. Equalitarianism and Human Welfare
A* Federal Aid to Education
B. Slum Clearance and Public Housing
C. Social Security Benefits
D. Minimum Wages
E. Enforcement of Integration
F. Immigration into the United States
IV. Tax Policy
A. Corporate Income Tax
B. Tax on Large Incomes
C m Tax on Business
D. Tax on Middle Incomes
E. Tax on Small Incomes
V. Foreign Policy
A. Reliance on the United Nations
B. American Participation in Military Alliances
C. Foreign Aid
D. Defense Spending

The samples to which the questionnaire was administered were
divided to form four comparison groups: (1) Democratic leaders,
(2) Republican leaders, (3) Democratic followers, (4) Republican
followers*
For each response, a quantitative value was assigned as follows:
"increase?'— 1.0, "decrease?*— 0, and "no change?' — 0.5.

For each issue,

the values of each response in a comparison group were summed and
divided by the number of respondents in the group (N).

The figure

which resulted from this computation was labeled a "ratio of support
score*"
When all computations were completed, the ratio of support
scores on an issue were compared and the
their values determined*

amount of difference in

The figure which represented the dif

ference in ratio of support scores between two groups was considered
an index of issue conflict for that group*
The researchers had anticipated that a comparison of scores
for the delegations to the party conventions would indicate that
significant issue conflict separates the elite factions of leadership
of the Democrats and the Republicans*
the data confirm this view*

By the authors® interpretation,

(See Tables 1 and 2*)

While McCloskey, Hoffman and 0*Hara failed to state their
definition of statistical significance for these figures, they implied
that the data show "that the leaders differ significantly on 23 of the
24 issues listed and that they are separated on 15c.of these issues by *18
or more ratio points— in short, by differences that are •

• very large."^3

TABLE 1
MEAN RATIO OF SUPPORT SCORES FOR PARTY LEADERS
IN THE McCLOSKEY TEAM'S STUDY, BY CATEGORY

Categories

Democrats*
Mean Score
(N«1,788)

Republicans*
Mean Score
(N-1,232)

Mean Level
of
Conflict

Public Ownership
of Resources

•76

*48

.28

Government
Regulation
of the Economy

.59

00
•

.11

Equalitarianism
and
Human Welfare

.71

.50

.21

Tax Policy

.36

.19

.17

Foreign Policy

.54

.39

.15

Comp i l e d from: Herbert McCloskey, Paul J* Hoffman, and
Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders
and Followers," in Political Parties and Political Behavior, ed* by
William J. Crotty, Donald M* Freeman and Douglas S« Gatlin (Bostons
Allyn and Bacon, Inc*, 1966), pp* 196-204*

TABLE 2
RATIO OF SUPPORT SCORES FOR PARTY LE A D E R ^
IN THE McCLOSKEY TEAM'S STUDY, BY ISSUE

Issue

Democrats'
Score
(N-1,788)

Republicans*
Score
(N-1,232)

Level of
Issue
Conflict

.83

.65

.18

Level of Farm
Price Supports

.58

.20

.38

Government
Regulation of
Business

.41

.33

.68

.73

.91

.18

Level of Tariffs

.35

.46

•11

Restrictions
on Credit

.43

.50

.07

Enforcement of
Anti-Monopoly Laws

Regulation of
Trade Unions

CM

00

Public Control
of Atomic Energy

.
o

.39

o
.

.30

.

.69

00
CO

Public Ownership
of Natural
Resources

TABLE 2--CONTINUED

Issue

Democrats*
Score
(N-1,788)

Republicans*
Score
(N«l,232)

Level of
Issue
Conflict

Regulation of
Public Utilities

.76

.50

.26

Federal Aid
to Education

.76

•40

.36

Slum Clearance and
Public Housing

•86

.59

.27

Social Security
Benefits

.78

.55

.23

Minimum Wages

.73

.52

•21

Enforcement of
Integration

•59

.47

.12

Immigration into
the United States

.54

.44

.10

Corporate Income Tax

.54

.21

.33

Tax on Large Incomes

.52

.24

.28

Tax on Business

.22

TABLE 2— CONTINUED

Democrats*
Score
(N«l,788)

Republicans*
Score
(N-1,232)

Level of
Issue
Conflict

Tax on Middle
Incomes

•26

00
•

•
o
00

Issue

Tax on Small Incomes

•11

.19

•08

Reliance on
the United Nations

•66

.45

.21

American Participation
in Military
Alliances

•62

.48

.14

Foreign Aid

.33

•23

.10

Defense Spending

.43

•40

.03

Com p i l e d from: Herbert McCloskey, Paul J. Hoffman, and
Rosemary O fHara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus ;Among Party Leaders
and Followers,*' in Political Parties and Political Behavior» ed. by
William J. Crotty, Donald M. Freeman and Douglas S. Gatlin (Bostons
Allyn and Bacon, Inc*, 1966), pp. 196-204.

Careful examination of the data in Tables 1 and 2 seems to
reveal that the threshold for "significance?' employed by Mcc loskey
et al. falls somewhere between differences of .03 ratio points
(considered not significant) and *07 ratio points (apparently
considered significant)•
The authors conclude that:
Despite the brokerage tendency of the American parties, their
active members are obviously separated by large and important
differences* The differences, moreover, conform with the
popular image in which the Democratic party is seen as the more
"progressive?* or "radical," the Republicans as the more
"moderate?* or "conservative'* of the two. In addition, the
disagreements are remarkably consistent, a function not of
chance»but of systematic points of view, whereby the res
ponses to any one of these issues could reasonably have
been predicted from knowledge of the responses to the other
issues.^
The two groups were separated most widely on the issue of
Public Ownership of Natural Resources, where conflict reached the
•39 level.

Closest harmony was found on the issue of Defense Spend

ing, where the factions differed by only .03 ratio points.

By cate -

gory, Public Ownership of Resources evidenced the widest gap between
scores while Foreign Policy matters showed the least divergence.
But even on Foreign Policy issues, the authors concluded, the con
flict in issue attitudes between the two parties* leaders is "signif
icant."
When McCloskey and his associates turned to data from the fol«
lowers sample and compared self-identified Democratic party members
with those who said they were Republicans, less issue conflict was
apparent.

TABLE 3
MEAN RATIO OF SUPPORT SCORES FOR PARTY FOLLOWERS
IN THE 1958 NATIONAL SAMPLE, BY CATEGORY

Republicans*
Mean Score
(N-623)

Mean Level
of
Conflict

Public Ownership
of Resources

.70

.66

•04

Government
Regulation of
the Economy

00
in
•

.53

.05

Equalitarianism and
Human Welfare

.70

.66

•04

Tax Policy

.42

.38

•04

Foreign Policy

.49

.47

CM
O

.

Democrats*
Mean Score
(N-821)

Category

Note:
Although McCloskey, Hoffman and O fHara reported that 1,484
questionnaires were returned in *®completely usable*1 form, their
tables show a total N of only 1,444* The authors offered no
explanation for this discrepancy.
C o m p i l e d from: Herbert McCloskey, Paul J. Hoffman, and
Rosemary 0*Hara, " Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders
and Followers,1* in Political Parties and Political Behavior, ed. by
William J. Crotty, Donald M. Freeman and Douglas S. Gatlin (Boston:
Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1966), pp. 196-204.

TABLE 4
RATIO OF SUPPORT SCORES FOR PARTY FOLLCIWgRS
IN THE 1958 NATIONAL SAMPLE, BY ISSUE

Democrats*
Score
(N-821)

Republicans*
Score
(N-623)

Level of
Issue
Conflict

Public Ownership
of Natural
Resources

•60

.56

.04

Public Control of
Atomic Energy

.70

•66

•04

Level of Farm
Price Supports

.56

•41

.15

Government
Regulation of
Business

.43

.31

•12

Enforcement of
Anti-Monopoly Laws

.73

.72

.01

Regulation of
Trade Unions

.69

.74

.05

Level of Tariffs

.46

.47

.01

Restrictions
on Credit

.58

.53

.05

Issue

TABLE 4--C0NTINUED

Regulation of
Public Utilities

.64

.57

.07

Federal Aid
to Education

.85

.78

.07

Slum Clearance and
Public Housing

.

Level of
Issue
Conflict

CM
00

Republicans*
Score
(N«*623)

•

Democrats*
Score
(N-821)

GO

Issue

.05

Social Security
Benefits

.83

.77

.06

Minimum Kages

.78

.69

.09

Enforcement of
Integration

.57

.59

.02

Immigration into
the United States

.29

.32

.03

Corporate Income Tax

.56

.49

.07

Tax on Large Incomes

.66

.56

.10

Tax on Business

.50

.42

*08

TABLE 4 — CONTINUED

Republicans*
Score
(N~623)

Level of
Issue
Conflict

Tax on Kiddle
Incomes

.28

.29

.01

Tax on Small Incomes

.12

.16

.04

Reliance on the
United Nations

.59

.57

.

American Participation
in Military
Alliances

.62

.58

.04

Foreign Aid

.26

.26

.00

Defense Spending

.67

.65

.
o

to

CM
O

Democrats*
Score
(N-821)

Issue

C o m p i l e d from: Herbert McCloskey, Paul J. Hoffman, and
Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders
and Followers," in Political Parties and Political Behavior, ed. by
William J. Crotty, Donald M. Freeman and Douglas S. Gatlin (Boston:
Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1966), pp. 196-204.

"The observation most clearly warranted from these data is
that the rank and file members of the two parties are far less
divided than their party leaders," they wrote.

"Not only do they

diverge significantly on fewer issues--seven as compared with
twenty-three for the leader samples--but the magnitudes of the
differences in their ratio scores are substantially smaller for
every one of the twenty-four issues."^
No index of conflict was greater then .14 for the followers*
samples.

On the majority of issues, the disparity was less than

.05.
The authors noted a pattern in the data:
All the issues on which the followers significantly disagree
are of the "bread and butter1* variety, the more symbolic
issues being so remotely experienced and so vaguely grasped
that rank and file voters are often unable to identify them
with either party. Policies affecting farm prices, business
regulation, taxes, or minimum wages, by contrast, are quickly
felt by the groups to whom they are addressed and are there
fore more capable of arousing partisan identifications. It
should also be noted that while the average differences are
small for all five categories, they are smallest of all for
foreign policy--the most removed and ifast well understood
groups of issues in the entire array.
In further examinations of their data, McCloskey and his
colleagues concluded that "there is substantial consensus on national
issues between Democratic leaders and Democratic and Republican
followers, while the Republican leaders are separated not only from
the Democrats but from their own rank and file members as

well."
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Republican followers were found to be in greater agreement on the
issues with Democratic leaders than with the leaders of their own

party*

The strongest pattern of consensus was found between

Democratic followers and their leaders*
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The authors drew six conclusions from their findings*

First,

they wrote, despite the assumption that the two American parties
are identical in doctrine and policy, the Democratic and Republican
leadership cadres were shown to be "distinct communities of
co-believers who diverge sharply on many important issues."

In

addition, the apparent negative reaction by Republican followers
to some stands taken by the Republican leadership can be taken as
an indication "that the parties submit to the demands of their
constituents less slavishly than is commonly supposed," they w r o t e * ^
Second, the leadership groups are most widely separated on those
issues "that grow out of their group identification and support— out
of the managerial, proletary, and high-status connections of the
one, and the labor, minority, low-status, and intellectual connec
tions of the other*

The opinions of each party elite are linked

less by chance than by membership in a-common ideological

domain."®*

A third conclusion summarized the lack of divergence among
followers*
Whereas the leaders of the two parties diverge strongly, their
followers differ only moderately in their attitudes toward
issues* The hypothesis that party beliefs unite adherents and
bring them into the party ranks may hold for the more active
members of a mass party but not for its rank and file
members • • « However, we cannot presently conclude that
ideology exerts no influence over the habits of party support,
for the followers do differ significantly and in the predicted
directions on some issues* (Italics mine)®!

Next, the authors argue, leaders are more articulate, informed
and involved, and therefore can be expected more readily to diverge
on issues*
"If the leaders of the two parties are not always candid
about their disagreements, the reason may well be that they sense
the great measure of consensus to be found among the electorate*,,®2
Here the authors seemed to imply that while the leaders do not ignore
a possible cleavage among the voters, their public presentations of
issue stands (cues) are muted to avoid offending what they perceive
as consensus among voters*
The fifth conclusion, actually a reservation, is that while
leaders may diverge on the issues, they do not necessarily act on
the basis of their opinions*

Different opinions between the

leadership factions is not prima facie evidence "that the two
parties are, in practice, governed by different outlooks."
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Finally, the authors concluded that the parties are not
necessarily most internally cohesive on those issues which separate
them clearly from the other parties* attitudes*
The effect of these conclusions most relevant to this
discussion is that, in one of the most widely respected and best
known examinations of issue conflict in the literature of voting
behavior, the notion of necessary convergence is not disconfirmed,
and that conclusions of the authors of that study lend support to
the notion*

Some observers apparently assumed, perhaps on the basis of a
shallow understanding of the findings, that the notion of necessary
convergence was confirmed by the data from the McCloskey team’s study.
If party leadership cliques diverge significantly on the issues but
groups within the electorate do not, then it must be true that the
leaders blunt their distinctive policy orientations during a
campaign to attract the broadest possible support, according to the
argument.
Before accepting this notion on the basis of the McCloskey
team’s research, however, subsequent researchers are wise to examine
carefully the procedure employed to reach those conclusions.
eral

Sev

aspectsof the researchtechnique invite questions.
First,

it is hazardous in empirical research to accept a

single cross-sectional measurement as evidence of a continuing phenom
enon.

Since McCloskey and his team conducted their voters survey in

1958, little research has been attempted either to corroborate or
to disconfirm their findings.
measurements

On this basis alone, additional

seem warranted, or, at least, highly desirable.

Regardless of how well the original study was designed and
executed, it could measure levels of issue conflict and consensus
only at one point in time.

In the absence of additional evidence to

confirm the findings, reliance on the authors* conclusions fifteen
years later seems risky.
But in the case of the McCloskey-Hoffman-O’Hara article,

several shortcomings in the research design and the methodology
seem to magnify the need for a closer look at the subject of their
inquiry.
For the leadership samples, the problems in the research are
glaring.
"Of the 6,848 delegates and alternates available to be
sampled," the authors explained, "3,193 actually participated; 3,020
(1,788 Democrats and 1,232 Republicans) completed and returned
0/i

questionnaires that were usable in all respects."
It appears that questionnaires were mailed to potential
respondentsKfor the leadership sample, and if a recipient completed
the questionnaire that was deemed "usable in all repects," he became
a member of the sample.

The authors do not explain the criteria

by which a questionnaire was judged "usable in all respects," or how
they decided to discard the 173 questionnaires which were returned,
but were not in a "usable?* form.
In addition to the initial mailing— to deliver the questionnaire
and explain the study— the researchers employed subsequent mailings
to encourage participation.
They seemed pleased that roughly 44 per cent of the potential
respondents submitted questionnaires which were useful for the
study.
"This gratifyingly large number of returns of so lengthy and
detailed a questionnaire was attained through a number of follow-up
mailings and special letters."

The problem, however, is that when the potential respondent
decided for himself whether to participate in the research, a
significant potential for bias was introduced to the sample.

I._

other words, in any experiment in which the subject is allowed to
decide for himself whether to join the sample group, it becomes pos
sible that those who do join will not accurately reflect a cross
section of the group being studied.

Does the 44 per cent mirror

the attitudes and perceptions of the other 56 per cent?

Or is

there something different about those who declined to participate?
Is the sample representative?

Does it serve as a microcosm of the

entire population under scrutiny in the experiment?

Or is a

sample in which subjects with an aversion to filling out
questionnaires are excluded truly representative of all the
potential subjects?
Such questions are particularly important in a survey of
attitudes, because the very decision not to participate in the
survey may be evidence of an attitudinal distinction on the part of
the non-joiners.
Similar problems exist in the sample of rank and file voters.
Procedures for this sample were somewhat better, however, than for
the leaders* groups.

By arrangement with the American Institute of

Public Opinion, the researchers selected two national cross section
samples.

Representatives of the institute personally distributed the

questionnaire to 2,917 adult yoters who had been selected.
Of that number, 1,610— or 55 per cent— of the voters filled

out the questionnaire and returned it* Only 1,484 of the questionnaires were judged "completely usable*"
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Again, standards of

usefulness were not defined*
Participation, it seems, was voluntary*

If the respondent

chose not to return the questionnaire by mail, he was omitted
from the final sample* No personal interviews were conducted*
As a result of these procedures, only 50*8 per cent of the
voters originally selected for the sample completed the full ques
tionnaire in an acceptable manner*

Data from the followers* sample,

then, was based on responses from slightly more than half of those
voters selected originally for the study*
The authors apparently remained confident that their sample was
not biased*

The rank and file sample "closely matched the national

population on such characteristics as sex, age, region, size of
city, and party affiliation, and, though it

somewhat oversampled

the upper educational levels, we considered it sufficiently large
and representative for most of our purposes," the authors wrote*
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In weighing the results of the research by McCloskey, Hoffman
and 0*Hara, one must ask to what extent the potential bias resulting
from selective participation may have affected the findings* Unfor
tunately, however, no answer is available*

All that is known is

that the sample may have been an inaccurate reflection of the
universe from which it was drawn*

But that possibility alone is

enough to cast doubt on the veracity of a researcher*s findings*

«?o

A final .caution regarding acceptance of the findings concerns
the timing of the study*

Perhaps this single measurement reflects a

political climate which has changed significantly in the intervening
years since the research data was gathered*
It has previously been noted that little corroborating evidence
has been assembled since the study first was published fifteen years
ago*

In addition to that gap, the researcher in 1975 must wonder if

a single cross sectional measurement reflects a situation which, even
if portrayed accurately in the 1958 data, has since been altered by
changes in the political climate of the United States*
Some might argue that the period during which the study was
conducted by Mccloskey, Hoffman and O*Hara was, in terms of issue
conflict between the two political parties, relatively quiescent
compared to conditions in 1964, 1968 and 1972*

Pomper has been

quoted as arguing that a greater distinction of the parties’ issue
stands emerged with the 1964 Presidential campaign and continued in
1968*

He described the decade of,the 1950s as characterized by

political stimuli which were "issueless and static,** as opposed to
those of the 1960s, which were more ” ideological and dynamic*”
Surely the clashes of Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater in
1964 and of Richard Nixon and George McGovern in 1972 left with the
voters

a greater sense of diverging party positions than did the

contests of Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson— contests marked
largely by personality and party label competition*
The researcher who looks at data on issue conflict that was

collected during the 1950s must weigh whether the absence of
clearly perceived divergence of the parties then necessarily pre
supposes issue consensus and precludes divergence in the more
turbulent years which followed.
In short, questions and even doubts about the reliability of
McCloskey, Hoffman and O ’Hara's conclusions after seventeen years
of almost unchallenged acceptance seems to make desirable a
re-examination of the questions they raised so articulately.
Such a re-examination is reported in the chapters which
follow.

CHAPTER III

THE HARRISONBURG, VIRGINIA, POLITICAL ATTITUDES SURVEY

The McCloskey team was well-financed for its ambitious
research effort.

McCloskey himself received grants from the Com

mittee on Political Behavior of the Social Research Council and
from the Graduate School Research Fund and a Fellowship in Legal
and Political Philosophy from the Rockefeller Foundation.
The subsequent re-examination attempt reported here was,
on the contrary, severely limited in financial resources.
Limitations in the scope of the re-examining study thus seemed
necessary and prudent.
While subsamples of the American electorate are available
in every town and county of the nation, access to a representative
sample of party leaders is much more limited.

An initial decision

was made, therefore, to re-examine levels of issue conflict only
among party followers and only in a small geographic area.

No

attempt was made to re-examine the levels of issue conflict among
the group McCloskey et: al. identified as "party leaders.”
In the winter of 1972-1973, initial steps were taken to
administer the relevant portions of the McCloskey team’s ques
tionnaire to a sample of rank and file party members to determine
levels of issue conflict between groups of Democratic and Republican

party identifiers.
The research project began with the selection of a site and
the drawing of a sample.

A questionnaire was composed and inter

viewers were trained in administering the questions.

Introductory

letters to the sample were drafted, prepared and mailed.

The data

were gathered by personal interview and the results were tabulated.
The data gathering process was completed during March, April and
May, 1973.
Because it was impossible to survey a national cross section
of the electorate, selection of a site from which to survey a sub
sample was dictated primarily by matters of convenience to the
researcher.
The city of Harrisonburg, Virginia,was chosen.
contributed to the decision.

Several factors

First, Harrisonburg is located about

180 miles from the researcher’s residence at that time, Williamsburg,
Virginia, allowing frequent trips between the research site and the
library, computer and faculty resources employed.

During the

months of data gathering, the research effort required as many
as three trips a week between the research site and the College of
William and Mary, in Williamsburg.
Second, the researcher had lived in Harrisonburg for nine
months during the preceding year, and had a basic knowledge of its
people, commerce and political climate.

Third, assistance with

survey interviews was available in Harrisonburg through the
researcher’s acquaintance with two students majoring in political

science at Madison College there*
No assumption was made that Harrisonburg voters are in any
way "typical” of voters in the United States*

Any such allegation

regarding any locality is, of course, highly questionable*

On the

contrary, the assumption was that no locality offered an electorate
which could be relied upon as a microcosm of the nation’s*

Selection

by factors of convenience, then, seemed reasonable*
At the time of the research the city, which is located in the
central Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, had a population of about
18,000 persons with 7,810 registered voters*

The five-man city

council was composed of three Democrats and two Republicans*

John

Kenneth Robinson, a Republican from Winchester, represented the
district (Va#-7) in the U.S. House of Representatives, having won
his seat in 1970 and retained it in 1972 in repeat races against a
Democratic candidate generally identified as "liberal*”

Prior to

1970, the district’s seat had been occupied for many years by
conservative Democrat John 0* Marsh, now Counsellor to President
Gerald R« Ford*

Marsh traditionally had carried the city, as had

Robinson in his 1970 and 1972 campaigns*
The city also had provided majorities for incumbent U.S.
Senators William L. Scott, a freshman Republican, and Harry F*
Byrd Jr*, an Independent*
Sen* Byrd’s father, a conservative Democrat, had held the
Senate seat now occupied by his son until his death in 1966*
elder Byrd, also of Winchester, had received support from the

The

voters of Harrisonburg during his many campaigns in Virginia*
Although portions of the Shenandoah Valley, including Harrisonburg,
have been called the nucleus of Republicanism in the state, the
city also is generally acknowledged to have been part of the elder
Byrd’s "stronghold*”

This is due in part to a generally conserv

ative trend among voters of the city, observers say*
Another factor contributing to Byrd’s popularity in the area
may be the Byrd family’s ownership of the city’s sole newspaper,
The Dally News Record* The Washington Post and the Richmond
Times-Disoatch also enjoy minority circulation in Harrisonburg*
One television station (WSVA-TV, an American Broadcasting
Corporation affiliate) is located just outside the city limits in
Rockingham County*

Local viewers also receive stations from

Washington, D.C., and Richmond by cable service, and some viewers
in the city also can receive stations from Roanoke*
Three major employers contribute to the local economy t
Dunham-Busch, Inc*, manufacturers of industrial and residential
heating and cooling units; Walker Manufacturing Co«, makers of
exhaust systems for automotive vehicles, and Madison College,
a state-supported institution with an enrollment of about 7,000
students*
Although various religious organizations play a role in the
spiritual life of the community, Harrisonburg is known primarily
as a center of the Mennonite faith*

Eastern Mennonite College,

one of the denomination’s two institutions of higher education, is

located in the city, as is an auxiliary school for primary and
secondary instruction*
Specific percentages of racial groupings are not available,
but the City Registrar estimated that, in 1973, less than 20 per
cent of Harrisonburg’s voters were non-white*
The unemployment rate for the city was less than 2.5 per cent
during the survey period, well below the national rate at that
time*
The city’s growth has been steady, but, as if in contrast to
the modern subdivisions, apartment complexes and shopping centers
under construction in the spring of 1973, hitching posts still
occupied a prominent place in municipal parking lots--for use by
the horse-drawn carriages which still are maneuvered on the city
stireets*

Rich farmland surrounds the city and the economy of

neighboring counties is dominated by agricultural pursuits*
It was the electorate of Harrisonburg, then, that served as
the universe from which a sample of 100 persons was drawn*

Randomly

selected numbers were matched to a computer printout of voters’ names
to select the potential respondents* names*
The researcher first obtained a copy of the list of all registered
voters in the city as of January 31, 1973*

By referring to a table

of random numbers, the researcher then selected 100 random numbers
between 1 and 7,810.

The 100 persons whose place in the alphabetical

listing of registered voters corresponded to the 100 randomly selected
numbers thus became the members of the sample group*

Despite a recent effort by the City Registrar to purge the
voters9 list of the names of persons known to have died, transferred
their registration or residency or otherwise disqualified themselves
as voters in Harrisonburg, several of those selected for the sample
were found to be deceased or to be no longer residents of the city*
For these eight members of the sample, substitutes were selected by
reference to the table of random numbers, using choices 101, 102,
103, etc*, as needed*
The members of the sample each received a letter in early spring
of that year, advising them they had been selected to be interviewed
as part of a study of voting behavior in the city*
letter is included in Appendix I*

A copy of the

The letter informed the individuals

that an interviewer would call on them at home and ask their cooper
ation in completing a questionnaire*
More than half the total 100 interviews were conducted by
the researcher himself*

Others were completed by two college

students whom the researcher had trained.

The researcher accom

panied the college students on early interviews and supervised
their procedures*
In an effort to provide the most direct basis for comparison
with the findings of the McCloskey team, the twenty-four issue por
tion of the earlier questionnaire was adopted verbatim for the
Harrisonburg survey*

A copy of the questionnaire employed in the

Harrisonburg interviews is included in Appendix II*

McCloskey,

Hoffman and O ’Hara had noted that these particular twenty-four

issues were selected for the original study because they were
deemed to be of "enduring* significance*
Additional questions included on the 1973 questionnaire were
items designed to determine the respondent’s age, sex, educational
level, perception of income level, length of residency in the
community and candidate preferences in the Presidential elections
of 1964, 1968 and 1972.
Administration of the questionnaire to a respondent took
about twenty minutes*

All respondents were cooperative*

Party identification of the respondent was determined by
response to three questions*

The interviewer first asked: "With

respect to national politics, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"
If the respondent indicated a partisan loyalty to one of the
two major parties, the interviewer asked: "Would you call yourself
a strong (Republican or Democrat) or a not very strong (Republican
or Democrat)?"
If the respondent answered the first question with any response
other than "Republican" or "Democrat/’ he was asked, "Do you think
of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?"
Based on responses to these questions, the respondents were
divided into three groups: (1) those who indicated a preference for
the Republican Party (fifty of those interviewed); (2) those who said
they were closer to the Democratic Party (forty of the respondents),
and (3) those who stuck to their independent status and declined to

indicate a preference for either party (ten respondents).

Since

data tabulations were designed primarily to compare Democratic
followers with Republican followers, the hard-core independent
respondents were not included in those tables designed to reflect
comparisons of party identifiers#
Subsequent tabulations which ignored party preference and
compared respondents’ issue positions with respect to such factors
as age, income level, education level and Presidential preference
in 1972 included data from the independent respondents, however#
While the method of sample selection and the interview tech
nique seem scientifically valid so as to engender confidence
in the results of the Harrisonburg survey, there is additional
evidence to bolster claims of accuracy for the research project#
One question on the interview form asked, "If a referendum
were held to determine if restaurants in Harrisonburg would be
allowed to serve mixed alcoholic drinks, how would you expect to
vote?"

The respondent was asked to reply either "Yes," "No,"

"Probably would not vote," or "Don’t know#"
The researcher had been made aware that some restaurateurs
in the city were considering a petition drive to call such a refer
endum#

No public mention of the move had been made during the survey

period#
The response to that question showed that 50 per cent of the
sample would vote in favor of allowing sale of mixed drinks, 28
per cent said they would vote "No," 11 per cent said "Don’t know,"

and another 11 per cent indicated they probably would not vote
on the issue*

Of those who did express an opinion on the question

and said they probably would vote on the issue, 64 per cent said
they would vote for approval and 36 per cent said they would vote
"No,"
Leaders of the city Democratic and Republican committees and
the editor of The Daily News Record *informed of the results on the
question* were surprised and skeptical*

They assumed* as did some

of the restaurateurs, that the city*s voters would be hesitant to
approve such a measure*
The referendum was held in November, 1973* and the proposal
was approved by more than 60 per cent of those who voted--approximately
the percentage found in the survey six months prior to the vote*
(A summary of the election and referendum results is available in
the State Board of Elections* bulletin of voting tabulations for
November* 1973*)
Despite these reassurances of accuracy for the Harrisonburg
survey* it is necessary to remember that the Harrisonburg research
project was a limited attempt to re-examine the findings of
McCloskey* Hoffman and 0*Hara in their earlier national survey*
Because it examined only the voters of one Virginia city, the
survey cannot be presented as a replication of the earlier research*
The attempt, again, is merely to re-examine the earlier findings
with reference to one locality to determine if they are valid for
rank and file party members in Harrisonburg* Virginia* during 1973.

That disclaimer notwithstanding, the findings which resulted
from the Harrisonburg research project provide an enlightening and
significant update to the original study*

CHAPTER IV

ISSUE CONFLICT AMONG HARRISONBURG VOTERS

Results of the Harrisonburg study differed from those of the
1953 survey of party followers by McCloskey and his colleagues in
startling proportion*

The average of issue conflict levels on all

twenty-four issues among the Democratic and Republican identifiers
surveyed in 1973 was three times greater than the comparable figure
for the 1958 study*
Conflict between Democrats and Republicans in the 1973 study
averaged *157 ratio of support points for the twenty-four issue list*
This compares with an average (mean) conflict of only *050 points
for the "followers" sample of the McCloskey-Hoffman-0#Hara survey*
(See Table 5*)
In the 1958 study, the single widest divergence between Democrats
and Republicans was on the issue of Farm Price Supports, where the
groups were separated by *15 ratio points*

The Harrisonburg study,

however, showed differences of *15 or greater occurred on thirteen
issues*

The greatest divergence, on Regulation of Trade Unions, was

•31 points— more than twice the largest gap in the 1958 study* (See
Table 6*)
McCloskey and his colleagues claimed their data show *'signif
icant" differences in ratio scores on eight of the twenty-four issues*

TABLE 5

MEAN LEVELS OF ISSUE CONFLICT FOR PARTY FOLLOWERS
IN THE 1958 NATIONAL SAMPLE AND
IN THE 1973 HARRISONBURG SAMPLE

Sample Group

Mean Level
of
Issue Conflict

Democratic Followers versus
Republican Followers,
1958 National Sample

•050

Democratic Followers versus
Republican Followers,
1973 Harrisonburg Sample

.157

TABLE 6
RATIO OF SUPPORT SCORES FOR PARTY FOLLOWERS
IN THE 1973 HARRISONBURG SAMPLE

Issue

Democrats*
Score
(N-40)

Republicans*
Score
(N«50)

Level of
Issue
Conflict

Public Ownership
of Natural
Resources

•70

.51

.19

Public Control of
Atomic Energy

.73

.50

.23

Level of Farm
Price Supports

.62

.47

.15

Government
Regulation of
Business

.50

•21

.29

Enforcement of
Anti-Monopoly Laws

.68

.69

.01

Regulation of
Trade Unions

.51

.82

.31

Level of Tariffs

.46

.57

•11

Restrictions
on Credit

.47

.53

.06

TABLE 6— CONTINUED

Issue

Democrats*
Score
(N-40)

Republicans*
Score
(N«50)

Level of
Issue
Conflict

Regulation of
Public Utilities

.68

•50

.18

Federal Aid
to Education

.87

.60

.27

Slum Clearance and
Public Housing

.91

»67

.24

Social Security
Benefits

.82

.77

.05

Minimum Wages

.85

.57

.28

Enforcement of
Integration

.62

.38

•24

Immigration into
the United States

.46

.34

.12

Corporate Income Tax

.78

.50

.28

Tax on Large Incomes

.90

.70

•20

Tax on Business

.67

.52

.15

TABLE 6— CONTINUED

Republicans*
Score
(N»50)

Level of
Issue
Conflict

.12

Reliance on the
United Nations

.55

American Participation
in Military
Alliances

.30

.32

.02

Foreign Aid

.25

CM

o
.

.05

Defense Spending

.35

.13

•02

«
o

Tax on Small Incomes

.29

.

.27

CM
CM

Tax on Middle
Incomes

.
00

Issue

Democrats*
Score
(N«40)

.46

.09

Unfortunately, however, the authorsneglected to define their
standard of "significance*1'

Careful analysis of their data indicates

that a difference of *07 ratio points or more apparently was consid
ered "significant*"
If the same
study, the number

standard is applied to the data from the 1973
of "significant?* conflicts over issues increases

sharply to eighteen* (See Table 7*)
On two issues— Farm Price Supports and Enforcement of
Anti-Monopoly Laws— the levels of conflict in the 1973 sample were
identical to those of the 1958 national sample*

On two other

issues, conflict in the 1973 study actually was lower than in the
earlier measurement*

Conflict over Social Security Benefits dropped

•01 ratio points from *06 to *05.
itary Alliances provoked a
down *02 from the

American Participation in Mil

conflict equal to only *02 ratio points,

*04 mark in the 1958 data*

On the remaining twenty issues, however, levels of issue con
flict between groups of Democratic and Republican identifiers were
markedly higher in the 1973 Harrisonburg survey than those reported
by McCloskey, Hoffman and 0 #Hara for the 1958 survey, as Table 7
shows*
When the data from the two samples are compared by category,
increases are noted in all five areas*

Largest increases in levels

of issue conflict occur in Public Ownership of Resources (up *17)
and Equalitarianism and Human Welfare (up *15).

The lowest conflict

level in both studies and the slightest increase was in Foreign Policy*
(See Table 8*)

TABLE 7

LEVELS OF ISSUE CONFLICT FOR PARTY FOLLOWERS
IN THE 1958 NATIONAL SAMPLE AND IN THE
1973 HARRISONBURG SAMPLE, BY ISSUE

Issue

Level of
Conflict,
1958
Sample

Level of
Conflict,
1973
Sample

Public Ownership
of Natural
Resources

Change in
Level of
Conflict

+ .15

Public Control of
Atomic Energy

•04

.23

+ .19

Level of Farm
Price Supports

.15

.15

mm

Government Regulation
of Business

.12

.29

+ .17

Enforcement of
Anti-Monopoly Laws

.01

.01

—

Regulation of
Trade Unions

.05

.31

+ .26

Level of Tariffs

•01

• 11

+ .10

Restrictions on
Credit

.05

•06

+ .01

TABLE 7— CONTINUED

Change in
Level of
Conflict

Level of
Conflict,
1958
Sample

Level of
Conflict,
1973
Sample

Regulation of
Public Utilities

.07

.18

+ .11

Federal Aid
to Education

.07

.27

+ .20

Slum Clearance and
Public Housing

.05

.24

+ .19

Social Security
Benefits

.06

.05

-.01

Minimum Wages

.09

.28

+ .19

Enforcement of
Integration

.02

.24

+ .22

Immigration into
the United States

.03

• 12

+ .09

Corporate Income Tax

.07

•28

+.21

Tax on Large Incomes

.10

.20

+ .10

Tax on Business

.08

.15

+ .07

Issue

TABLE 7— CONTINUED

Level of
Conflict,
1958
Sample

Level of
Conflict,
1973
Sample

Tax on Middle
Incomes

.01

.02

+ .01

Tax on Small Incomes

.04

.10

+ .06

Reliance on the
United Nations

.02

.09

+ .07

Issue

American Participation
in Military
Alliances

Change in
Level of
Conflict

-.02

Foreign Aid

•00

.05

+.05

Defense Spending

.02

.13

+.11

TABLE 8
MEAN LEVELS OF ISSUE CONFLICT FOR PARTY FOLLOWERS
IN THE 1958 NATIONAL SAMPLE AND IN THE
1973 HARRISONBURG SAMPLE, BY CATEGORY

Category

Public Ownership
of Resources

Mean Level
of Issue
Conflict,
1958
Sample

Mean Level
of Issue
Conflict,
1973
Sample

.04

•21

Government
Regulation of
the Economy

Change in
Mean Level
of Issue
Conflict

+ .17

+ .10

Equalitarianism and
Human Welfare

.05

.20

+.15

Tax Policy

.06

.15

+ .09

Foreign Policy

.02

.07

+ .05

In the earlier research, McCloskey and his colleagues noted
that conflict was greatest on issues with the most direct impact
on the voters— matters pertaining to money.

Conflict levels of

•06 ratio points— greatest level of divergence by category— were
recorded for both the Government Regulation of the Economy cate
gory and the Tax Policy area in the 1958 data.
In the 1973 sample, however, domestic social concerns seemed
to divide the Democrats and Republicans more than pocketbook issues.
Conflict on Government Regulation of the Economy was third among
categories at .10 ratio points.

Tax Policy issues ranked fourth in

level of conflict, with a .09 level separating the party groups.
On the issue of Public Ownership of Natural Resources, the
McCloskey team’s research showed Democratic followers* support at
•60 and Republican support at .56, for a conflict level of only .04.
In the Harrisonburg study, however, Democrats had an aggregate
ratio of support score of .70 while Republicans showed only .51
support.

The two parties seemed to move in opposite directions from

the stands recorded in the earlier research.

The level of conflict

in 1973 was .19, up .15 points over the 1958 national sample.
Both party groups showed less support in the 1973 study for
Public Control of Atomic Energy than was recorded in the earlier
survey.

Democrats in 1973 scored .73, down from .79, and Repub

licans dropped to .50 from an earlier .75.

Issue conflict increased

from the McCloskey team’s measurement of .04 to a fairly high mark
of .23.

The parties’ supporters also diverged more widely in opin
ions regarding Government Regulation of Business in the
Harrisonburg study than did the national sample as reported by
McCloskey, Hoffman and O ’Hara*

The earlier .43-.31 Democratic

to Republican split increased to a *50-*21 gap, thus increasing
the conflict measurement from *12 points to *29*
Similar divergence over the Regulation of Public Utilities
resulted in a conflict measurement for the 1973 sample of *18,
up *11 over McCloskey and his colleagues* 1958 findings*
Democrats in the Harrisonburg sample reflected the same
ratio of support score as their earlier counterparts on the issue
of Level of Tariffs— .46*

Republicans in the 1973 study, however,

were more eager for an increase in tariffs than their counterparts
had been, with the support score rising from *47 for the national
group to *57 for the Harrisonburg group*
Democratic support decreased, while Republican support
increased for Restrictions on Credit, but the level of conflict
rose from *01 to *05 points*

And while Democratic support for

Federal Aid to Education was slightly higher in the Harrisonburg
sample than in the earlier national group, Republican support
among the Harrisonburg voters was down *18 points from the 1958
measurement of national Republicans*

Conflict on the issue rose

from *07 to .27 ratio points.
In other areas of what McCloskey and his colleagues called the
" Equal itari an ism and Human Welfare?' category, Republican support

among respondents in the Harrisonburg sample decreased from that of
the national G.O.P. sample, while local Democrats* scores were
higher than their predecessors.

Conflict levels rose on all but

the Social Security Benefits issue in this category.

Conflict

between the party groups was *19 points higher on Slum Clearance
and Public Housing

and on Minimum Wages, and .22 points higher

on Enforcement of Integration.

Republican support for Immigration

into the United States increased slightly, and Democratic support
increased briskly.

Conflict on the issue rose by .09 ratio points

to a level of .12.
While both Democrats and Republicans scored higher support
marks in the 1973 study on taxes of Corporate Incomes, Large Incomes
and Businesses, the Democratic jumps outstripped the Republicans*,
and conflict on the three issues increased over the 1958 data.
Scores on the Tax on Middle Incomes issue were almost identical to
those of the earlier study, but Republicans in Harrisonburg seemed
more willing to increase Taxes on Small Incomes than their counter
parts had been in the national sample, while Democrats in the 1973
study mirrored their partisans* score in the earlier national data.
Conflict on the issue increased slightly, from .04 in the 1958
study to .10 in the subsequent research.
Support for Reliance on the United Nations and for Foreign
Aid was less evident among voters of both parties in the 1973 group
than it had been in the McCloskey-Hoffman-O*Hara study.

Conflict

over the U.N* rose .07 points in the Harrisonburg survey to a .09

8L

level*

While there was apparent consensus in the earlier study on

the Foreign Aid issue, the 1973 study reflected a conflict level of
*05 points.
Although conflict on American Participation in Military
Alliances was less among the 1973 sample than in the earlier data,
a significant shift in the magnitude of support from both parties
was evident*

In the 1958 survey, the researchers found Democrats*

support for the issue at *62 points, while Republicans scored *58.
In the 1973 study, Democratic support for the matter had slipped to
only *30 points and the Republicans scored only *32*

This mutual

sliding of support within roughly the same thin margin of conflict
may be evidence of an enduring consensus between the parties on
an issue about which attitudes have shifted in tandem over the
last fifteen years*
A similar phenomenon is apparent in the data on the issue of
Defense Spending*

In the earlier study, Democratic support was

recorded at the *67 level and Republicans scored *65— near consen
sus*

In the Harrisonburg sample, Democrats scored only *35 while

the Republicans also had less support than the earlier national
Republican sample*

The Republican decrease to *48 was more mod

erate than the Democrats, and conflict on the issue increased from
•02 in the 1958 data to *13 points for the later sample*

Again, the

lower scores recorded by botfr parties may indicate a change in the
public attitude and an alteration of the voters* positions on the
issue, while the parties* positions vis a_ vis each other may have

changed less substantially*
Careful analysis of the data from the 1973 Harrisonburg study
reveals that, of six variables, political party identification
provides the greatest level of issue conflict among groups of
respondents*

Members of the sample also were divided into categories

for comparison by age, income level, educational level, 1972
Presidential preference and participation versus non-participation
in the 1972 Presidential balloting*

In each comparison, respond

ents differed less sharply over the twenty-four issues than did
blocs of party identifiers in 1973*

Mean levels of issue

conflict for the twenty-four issue list were tabulated for each
comparison* When data for the comparison of party identifiers from
the 1958 survey was added to the list of mean levels of issue
conflict, it became apparent that while party identifiers in
1973 differed more sharply than any other groups tabulated,
the 1958

party identifiers had the least conflict of all groups

considered* (See Table 9*)
As
the 1973

noted previously, the mean level of issue conflict for
party identifiers was *157*

The

second highest mean

conflict was found in the comparison of McGovern voters to Nixon
voters in the 1972 Presidential election*

Divergence between the

two groups reached a mean level of *128*
Respondents who claimed to have voted in the 1972 election
were in conflict with those who said they had not gone to the polls
by a mean score of *124*

TABLE 9
MEAN LEVELS OF ISSUE CONFLICT FOR SEVEN VARIABLES,
SIX FROM THE 1973 HARRISONBURG SAMPLE AND
ONE FROM THE 1958 NATIONAL SAMPLE

Variable

Mean Level of Issue Conflict

Democratic Followers versus
Republican Followers,
1973 Sample

.157

McGovern Voters versus
Nixon Voters,
1973 Sample

.128

Voters versus Non-voters
for President in 1972,
1973 Sample

.124

Low and Lower Middle Income Group
versus Middle and Upper Middle Group,
1973 Sample

•085

Voters 35 and Under versus
Those over 35 Years Old,
1973 Sample

.078

Less Educated Voters versus
Those with Education Beyond
High School Diploma,
1973 Sample

Democratic Followers versus
Republican Followers,
1958 Sample

.076

.050

As Table 9 indicates, those respondents who perceived their
household income level as either "Low** or "Lower Middle" differed
from those who considered themselves in the "Middle?* or " Upper
Middle” bracket by a mean level of conflict of .085.

Those between

eighteen and thirty-five years of age conflicted with those
thirty-six and older by a mean level of .078.
Respondents whose maximum educational advancement was not
beyond high school graduation were in conflict with those who had
some post-high-school educational experience by a mean score of
.076.
But the average difference between Democrats and Republicans
in the survey conducted in 1958 was a smaller figure— only .050.
While it is possible that such differences would have been found
among voters in Harrisonburg even during the period of the earlier
research, it also seems possible that some intervening factor or
set of factors has increased voters* tendencies to disagree with
their fellow citizens on these twenty-four issues.
The relative ease with which levels of conflict greater than
those demonstrated in the 1958 research are detected among groups
of respondents in Harrisonburg who have no apparent reason to be
in significant conflict over the range of issues seems to indicate
one of two things.

Either the voters of Harrisonburg are inclined

to more divergent views on these issues than are voters in the
U.S. as a whole, or, if Harrisonburg voters are more closely
representative of the nation*s electorate, the situation has been

altered since the McCloskey team's reading of the national sample's
responses in 1958.

A third possibility, of course, is that the

earlier data was simply inaccurate, even for the period in which the
measurement was made.
In any event, the hypothesis that a re-examination of levels
of issue conflict between Democratic and Republican followers would
reveal significantly higher levels of divergence than were discovered
in the 1958 national study is confirmed by the data from the 1973
Harrisonburg survey.

Levels of issue conflict between Democrats

and Republicans sampled in Harrisonburg are indeed far greater than
the conflict levels demonstrated in the McCloskey-Hoffman-O*Hara
research.
Proving an increase in issue conflict levels among a sample
of voters in Harrisonburg, Virginia, in 1973 does not disconfirm
the findings of McCloskey and his colleagues in 1958.

The results

in Harrisonburg do not confirm a change in national political
attitudes.

Nevertheless, the data do seem to indicate the pos

sibility that a change in the amount of divergence between
Democratic identifiers and Republican identifiers may have occurred
since the earlier measurement and that the parties' supporters
now may be separated by a more clearly distinguishable gulf.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Like the study it sought to re-examine, the research project
reported herein is a single, cross-sectional measurement.

By the

nature of such a study, the implications that may be drawn from
the data are limited.
It may be significant to note, however, that studies by other
researchers on the question of issue conflict between groups of party
followers in recent years have resulted in findings which point in
the same direction as those from the Harrisonburg study.
In their article, "Political Parties and Political Issues:
Patterns in Differentiation, 1940-1972," Everett Carll Ladd Jr. and
Charles D. Hadley explored data covering a thirty-two-year period
and sought to determine levels of "party distance,** or issue conflict.
The scope of their study spanned what Ladd and Hadley termed "the
change-dominated years from FDR to Nixon.'*

88

The authors examined voting behavior from the period to
determine the extent of differences on issue orientations between
"behavioral" Democrats and Republicans as well as self-identified
party supporters.

By "behavioral" party members, they meant those

voters who actually voted for the candidates of a given party, not
merely those voters who declare themselves "closer to?* the party.

Ladd and Hadley concluded that there has been substantial
issue distance in both foreign policy matters and domestic issues
throughout the period, although such differences were of less mag
nitude during the middle 1950s than at other times*

Differences on

foreign policy matters have been less dramatic than those on domestic issues, they said*

89

"Since 1940 (and presumably since the beginning of the New
Deal), there have been sharp Republican-Democratic differences
across virtually the whole range of domestic and social welfare
matters,” Ladd and Hadley wrote*

Although less clearly defined

by the data, differences in foreign policy matters "are substantial
and hardly random," they added.

90

Civil rights issues divided party adherents throughout the
period, the authors observed, although the width of the attitudinal
gap is more pronounced during the 1960s and early 1970s (when such
issues gained greater salience) than in the 1940s and 1950s*

The

apparent impact of changing political context on levels of issue
conflict here should not be ignored*
The authors noted specifically that party distance during
"Eisenhower's 'era of good feeling'" was less "than in subsequent
years•"

91

The data of McCloskey, Hoffman and O'Hara were among those
analyzed by Ladd and Hadley*

They concluded that the McCloskey

team's findings, when compared to data for the entire period 1940
to 1972, showed lower levels of party distance (or issue conflict)

than was apparent for other years*

This observation supports the

notion that McCloskey and his associates* measurement reflected a
relatively quiescent period in recent U.S. politics and that changes
in political context are significantly related to variations in the
level of issue conflict between blocs of party followers*

92

Ladd and Hadley attempted to put their findings in perspec
tive*

They acknowledged that "the structure of the American

two-party arrangement has served as a factor working to reduce
inter-party differences on most political questions."
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They

also observed, as was noted here earlier, that a 11narrow coalition
operating in a multi-party systenf' has an easier time maintaining
a high level of issue coherence and cohesiveness among its
supporters*

A mass party in a two-party system, however, must

"accommodate conflicting aims of diverse groups," the authors wrote*
"Since it is internally heterogeneous, its collective distinc
tiveness from its opponents must be relatively modest."

Each of

the two major American parties is "an unwieldy diffuse alignment
of state and local units, and of a broad range of social groups,"
they wrote*

94

In light of these observations about the nature of American
political parties, Ladd and Hadley contended that the levels of
issue conflict demonstrated in their data were of great significance*
With such entrenched factors at work to minimize attitudinal dis
agreement, any conflict between party blocs is noteworthy, they
said*

In this context, the inter-party distance which we documented
for the period since 1940 must be seen as remarkably sub
stantial* Data presented • • • ,showing a pattern of con
sistent and persistent differences between the citizenry parties
on a wide range of issues, are all the more striking, that is,
because of what is perhaps the most salient feature of the
American party system, the broadly inclusive "umbrella?1
character of the coalitions*
Ladd and Hadley's comments, of course, are equally applicable
to the results of the 1973 Harrisonburg survey*
The Ladd and Hadley data lend support to the notion that
issue" conflict levels may have increased nationwide among party
followers since the period of the McCloskey team's research.
The Harrisonburg data, too, seem

to imply development of greater

levels of conflict between party blocs than was evident in the report
of the 1958 survey.
Neither the Ladd and Hadley data nor the Harrisonburg results
prove conclusively that issue conflict for U.S# voters has, in fact,
increased*

That could be proved only by comparing two or more

compatible sets of data*

Unfortunately, the McCloskey team's

questionnaire apparently has not been re-administered to a
national sample under the same procedures as originally employed.
On the basis of these more recent findings, however, the question
may at least be raised more forcefully than before.
The data from the Harrisonburg survey prove very little about
the nature of the American system of political parties*

Most of the

broad issues and arguments presented in Chapter One of this paper
remain unanswered*

The scope of accomplishment for the research project reported
here is relatively small— a narrowly drawn hypothesis appears to
have been confirmed by the data*

The 1973 survey of voters in

Harrisonburg did indeed discover higher levels of issue conflict
than were reported for the ” followers” portion of the 1958
national study*
It is proved, therefore, that the level of issue conflict
between democratic and Republican identifiers in one city of
Virginia during the spring of 1973 was higher on twenty-four
specific national issues than between democratic and Republican
followers in a nationwide sample surveyed fifteen years previously*
Little else can be said with certainty, based solely on the
data gathered during the project and analyzed above*
The certainty of this one discovery, however, leads
inevitably to speculation on other matters*

Based on the McCloskey

team's findings, it was believed likely that voters in Harrisonburg,
as in the nation as a whole, would be clustered around a single
viewpoint on each issue, with little or no issue conflict
separating the parties' supporters.

That was not the case for

Harri sonburg, however•
If the level of issue conflict in Harrisonburg in 1973 did not
follow the national pattern expressed in the 1958 data, perhaps
it would not do so in other localities*

Perhaps parties' sup

porters in other portions of the United States are similarly
divided by conflicts over issues of national policy*

If this is the case, and voters are divided on the issues
along lines of party loyalty, the notion of necessary convergence
is due for careful re-analysis*

If party constituencies are

diverging bodies of voters, then perhaps the parties themselves
can diverge more dramatically at the leadership level without
fear of losing support of their followers*

Perhaps the lack

of candor which McCloskey, Hoffman and O'Hara noted among party
leaders can give way to more straightforward pronouncements of
the leaders' positions*

In short, if the voters are not

clustered around a single viewpoint but are separated in
partisan blocs which hold distinctive positions, then the parties,
too, can become distinctive alternatives

to each other*

Perhaps the parties already are distinct alternatives and
the divergence of the voters is a reaction to divergent party
cues*

Or perhaps the voters have drifted apart independent of

party cues and the parties now are in a position to react to
the voters' movement*
In any event, the idea that parties must converge is
subject to question, and researchers with greater resources and
patience should direct further investigations in this direction.
It is tempting to postulate that the 1970s may be character
ized by significantly greater national conflict on these
twenty-four issues than were the 1950s, and that the political
context already has changed dramatically, altering with it the
political landscape of the American electorate.

While the pos

sibility of such a change in the nature of the American voter may
not comfort those engaged in the painstaking process of cataloguing
the characteristics of the electorate, perhaps the possibility offers
an important message to researchers in the field of voting behavior*
the voter may not be so one-dimensional as to be easily described
by simple or even elaborate cross-sectional surveys.

While they

add significantly to the body of knowledge, such surveys are only
stepping stones*

The conclusions which flow from such measurements

must be re-checked continually*
In short, the seminal studies which were conducted early in
the development of our knowledge of voting behavior may be due
for close scrutiny and re-examination in light of possible changes
in the political climate and in the characteristics of the American
electorate*

APPENDIX I
INTRODUCTORY LETTER TO MEMBERS OF THE
HARRISONBURG SAMPLE
March 27, 1973

Dear Harrisonburg Voter,
I am a graduate student in the Department of Government at
the College of William and Mary, currently working on a research
project as part of the requirements for a Master*s degree*

I live

in Keezletown, and I’ve decided to concentrate my research in the
Harrisonburg area*

This study will involve a survey of political

attitudes of voters in the city of Harrisonburg.
Your name is one of those which was selected at random to be
a part of the survey.

Within the next several weeks, an interviewer

will call on you at home to ask you several questions*

His or her

questions will take only a few minutes, and I can assure you that
your responses will be kept in confidence— your name will not be
used*
This project is, of course, very important to me, and I
thank you in advance for your cooperation*
Sincerely,

Haywood Blakemore

APPENDIX II

QUESTIONNAIRE EMPLOYED FOR THE HARRISONBURG
POLITICAL ATTITUDES SURVEY

# ___________

Precinct
Intervi ewer__________

(Read) This survey is part of an academic research project
being conducted by a graduate student at the College of William and
Mary.
I'm going to ask you a number of questions about your
political views, and I'd appreciate your cooperation. Your
responses will be kept in confidence and your name will not be
used.

1. How long have you lived in Harrisonburg?
less than five years
years

five to ten years

more than twenty years

all m y

ten to

twenty

life

no response
2. For how many years have you been a registered voter?
less than five years
ten years

five to ten years

more than

no response

3. What is your occupation?(Interviewer classify.)
blue collar
merchant
retired

white collar
clerical

student

unemployed

no response

(Indicate the respondent's sex.
male

housewife

female

Do not ask.)

APPENDIX II— CONTINUED

5. With respect to national politics, do you ususally think of your
self as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?
republican

democrat_____ independent

no response

6. (If Republican or Democrat) Would you call yourself a strong
(Republican or Democrat) or a not very strong (Republican or
Democrat)?
(If Independent) Do you think of yourself as closer to the
Republican or Democratic party?
strong republican
weak democrat
democrat

weak republican

strong democrat

independent republican
solid independent

independent

no response

7. through 30* (Give the respondent the issue sheet and a pencil.)
Here is a list of some national issues. I’d like you to indicate
in the proper column whether you favor an increase, a decrease
or no change for each issue.
31. In talking to people'about last November’s election, we find
that a lot of people weren’t able to vote because they weren’t
registered, or they were sick or they just didn’t have the
time. How about you, did you vote this time?
yes
32.

For

no

whom did you vote in the November
McGovern

33.

How

no response

Nixon

about in 1968.

Humphrey

Nixon

Schmitz

other

Do you recall how
Wallace

Presidentialelection?
didn’t vote

you voted?

other ______ didn’t vote

34. Now how about the 1964 election, when President Johnson and
Senator Goldwater were running. How did you vote then?
LBJ

Goldwater

other

didn’t vote
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35. And finally, in the 1960 race, with Kennedy and Nixon.
recall how you voted that time?
JFK

Nixon

other

didn’t vote

Do you

no response_____

36. (Hand respondent Card #1.) W e ’re interested in how far you went
in school. Tell me what number on this card indicates the highest
grade you completed.
grade 1-5

grade 6-8

1-2 years college

grade 9-11

high school grad

3-4 years college

post-graduate work

college grad

no response

37. (Hand respondent Card #2.) Which of the numbers on this card
indicates the category of your household income, in your opinion?
lower
upper

lower

middle

middle

upper middle

no response

38. (Hand respondent Card #3.) Which of the numbers on this card
indicates the category which includes your present age?
18-25_____ 26-35
over 65

36-45___

46-55_____

56-65___ _

no response

39. How do you react to the following statement: A local law which
would allow restaurants in the city to serve mixed drinks of
alcoholic beverages would be a good thing. Do you agree, strongly
agree, disagree or strongly disagree?
strongly agree

agree

disagree

strongly disagree

no response
40. If a referendum were held to determine if restaurants in
Harrisonburg would be allowed to serve mixed alcoholic drinks,
how would you expect to vote, yes or no?
yes

no

probably would not vote

no response

APPENDIX II— CONTINUED
ISSUE SHEET FOR QUESTIONNAIRE
Issue

Increase

1* Public Ownership of
Natural Resources
2* Public Control of
Atomic Energy
3* Level of Farm
Price Supports
4. Government Regulation
of Business
5* Enforcement of
Anti-Monopoly Laws
6* Regulation of
Trade Unions
7. Level of Tariffs
8. Restrictions on Credit
9* Regulation of Public
Utilities
10. Federal Aid to Education
11* Slum Clearance and
Public Housing
12. Social Security Benefits
13* Minimum Wages
14. Enforcement of Integration
15. Immigration into the
United States
16. Corporate Income Tax

100

Decrease

No Change

APPENDIX II— CONTINUED
Issue

Increase

17. Tax on Large Incomes
18. Tax on Business
19. Tax on Middle Incomes
20. Tax on Small Incomes
21. Reliance on the United Nations
22. American Participation in
Military Alliances
23. Foreign Aid
24. Defense Spending
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Decrease

No Change
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